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Zoning Law
Roy

P.

COOKSTON* AND BURT BRUTON**

The authors survey recent judicial and legislative developments in the Florida law of zoning, including the impact of
mandatory comprehensive zoning, various flexible zoning methods, and discriminatoryand confiscatory zoning. They also examine the "taking" issue in the zoning context and possible solutions through compensable regulation.
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MANDATORY COMPREHENSIVE ZONING

Ever since the Supreme Court of the United States approved
zoning as a device to regulate the orderly growth of cities in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,1 the antagonism between
"piecemeal" zoning and the requirement of comprehensiveness has
bedeviled practitioners. Relying on Euclid, Chief Justice Davis of
*
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1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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the Supreme Court of Florida recognized in 1934 that zoning ordinances, to be constitutional, must implement "some 'plan' that is
general and comprehensive in character."' In the five decades following Euclid, however, all grants of zoning power to local governments in Florida were optional, rather than mandatory.3 Therefore,
many Florida counties and cities had no master plan or zoning ordinances at all. Even in areas with good comprehensive plans, the
inevitable changes in population density, land values, neighborhood character, and traffic patterns led to piecemeal rezoning, variances, and special permits-resulting in crazy-quilt patterns of
zoning difficult to justify or defend.
These factors, coupled with concerns about energy and the environment, led the Florida Legislature to adopt the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (LGCPA).4 The
LGCPA requires for the first time that all cities and counties
adopt a comprehensive plan, including a land use element.8 Striking a major blow against piecemeal zoning and for consistency between the plan and zoning, the LGCPA declares: "All land development regulations enacted or amended shall be consistent with
the adopted comprehensive plan or element or portion thereof."6
The decision in City of Gainesville v. Cone7 in 1978, although
involving a comprehensive land use plan adopted in 1970 before
2. State ex rel. Henry v. City of Miami, 117 Fla. 594, 600, 158 So. 2d 82, 84 (1934)
(Davis, C.J., concurring). The majority of the Henry court, however, rejected a landowner's
challenge to an uncomprehensive ordinance because the particular zoning enabling statute
was permissive rather than mandatory.
3. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b); FLA. STAT. § 176.04 (1971) (repealed 1973); id.
9 133.03 (1969) (repealed 1971); County Government Act, id. § 125.01(1)(h) (1979); Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, id. §§ 166.021, .041(3)(c); County and Municipal Planning for
Future Development Act, id. §§ 163.160-.315.
4. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1979)). The
LGCPA provides the minimum requirements for planning and is superior to any conflicting
statutes relating to local government land development regulations, unless the latter meet or
exceed the LGCPA's provisions. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161(7), .3211 (1979).
5. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (1979). In addition to a land use element, the comprehensive plan must include elements for traffic circulation, sanitary sewer, solid waste disposal,
potable water, conservation, recreation, open space, housing, coastal zone protection, intergovernmental coordination, and utilities. Id. § 163.3177(6)(b)-(i). Additionally, the plan may
include optional elements for mass transit, port and aviation facilities, bicycle paths and
riding trails, off-street parking, public buildings and services, recommended community design, redevelopment, safety, historical and scenic preservation, and an economic guide for
future commercial and industrial development. Id. § 163.3177(7).
6. Id. § 163.3194(1). Other jurisdictions lacking a statute like LGCPA that mandates
consistency have nevertheless upheld comprehensive plans as the standard for determining
the validity of existing zoning ordinances. See Note, Land Use Planning, 1976 Developments in Florida Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 1119 (1977).
7. 365 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

1981]

ZONING LAW

passage of the LGCPA, illustrates some of the problems encountered when comprehensive future planning concepts collide with
existing zoning ordinances. In Cone, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, rejected a landowner's demand that the city upzone
his property for the multifamily uses designated in the comprehensive plan. Holding that the adoption of the plan had not amended
the previous zoning classification, the court relied on language in
the plan characterizing it as only a guide, the logic of which would
encourage future zoning changes. Because the previous zoning remained unchanged, the inconsistency with the plan gave the landowner no vested right to demand multifamily zoning. Although the
local planning board had recommended against changing either the
zoning or the plan, the city commission achieved consistency between them by amending the comprehensive plan to reduce the
designated density.8
In City of Gainesville v. Hope,9 the First District applied its
holding in the Cone case that the comprehensive plan did not affect existing zoning, but was only a guide for future zoning. In
Hope, the city commission amended its plan to designate a landowner's parcels for more intensive uses, but the corresponding zoning change failed to garner a "super majority" of the commission,
as required by the city charter and code. 10 The court rejected the
landowner's argument that the resulting inconsistency between the
amended plan and the unchanged zoning had unlawfully confiscated his property. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the
First District will attach any greater significance to inconsistencies
between zoning ordinances and comprehensive plans adopted
under the LGCPA.1"
8. Id. at 738. The court focused on the commission's action rather than the advisory
planning board's recommendation. A local ordinance required that changes recommended
by the board be consistent with the comprehensive plan unless the board also recommended
a change in the plan to maintain consistency. The planning board had first petitioned the
commission to reduce the density designated in the plan, but later reversed its position and
recommended against its own petition. Thus, although its recommendation would have
maintained an inconsistency between the zoning and the plan, the board had recommended
no inconsistent changes.
9. 377 So. 2d 736, 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
10. On interlocutory appeal in Hope v. City of Gainesville, 355 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1977),
the supreme court upheld the "super majority" requirement of approval by a four-fifths
vote of the commission whenever twenty percent of the land ownership in the immediate
area objected to the proposed zoning change.
11. In contrast to inconsistent existing zoning ordinances, zoning changes have received
more rigorous scrutiny by Florida courts when inconsistent with the comprehensive plan.
For example, in Dade County Ass'n of Unincorporated Areas v. Board of County Comm'rs,
45 Fla. Supp. 193 (Dade Cty. Ct. 1975), the court struck down an inconsistent zoning change
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Setting out the legislative intent and purpose in lyrical alliterative prose, the preamble to the LGCPA declares that it will help
local governments
preserve, promote, protect, and improve the public health,
safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience, law enforcement and fire prevention, and general welfare; prevent the
overcrowding of land and avoid undue concentration of population; facilitate the adequate and efficient provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, recreational facilities,

housing, and other requirements and services; and conserve, develop, utilize, and protect natural resources within their
jurisdictions. 12

The LGCPA also encourages cooperation and coordination between various governmental units and agencies and mandates the
adoption of procedures to ensure the broadest possible public participation in the comprehensive planning process."3 This populist
approach to planning conjures up a "sea to shining sea" vision of
Florida citizens rising up to plan their cities of tomorrow.
The LGCPA required all 390 cities, sixty-seven counties, and
two special districts in Florida to adopt a comprehensive plan by
July 1, 1979, subject to two one-year extensions ending July 1,
1981.14 Many cities and counties initially took no action at all, perhaps expecting that the legislature would repeal the LGCPA.
When it did not, 371 local government units had to request extensions of the first deadline for compliance. Many of them hurriedly
drafted sketchy comprehensive plans in vague, convoluted language, apparently in the hope that whatever future governmental
action they might take, the plan would contain some language to
support it.15 Despite five years' notice and two extensions of the
as illegal and void:
The recommendations and conclusions contained within the comprehensive
development master plan ... may not be indiscriminately ignored in the exercise of the zoning power....
[T]he official recommendations and conclusions of
the master plan and area restudy carry a presumption of correctness and they
should be followed unless there are compelling reasons to depart therefrom.
Id. at 199.
12. Id. § 163.3161(3).
13. Id. §§ 163.3161(4), .3204, .3181.
14. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(2), (3), (7) (1979). As of the date of publication of this article,
The Florida Legislature was considering a proposal to extend the date for final compliance
again to January 1, 1982. FLA. S.B. 958, 1981 Reg. Sess.; Fla. H.B. 1080, 1981 Reg. Sess.
15. Examples of vague drafting include one city's objective for its drainage element:
"Developments should, to the extent feasible, give consideration to minimizing the extent of
impervious surfaces with the view to encouraging natural groundwater recharge." Another
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deadline, the box score on compliance has been disappointing. As
of October 31, 1980, only 221 local government units had adopted
comprehensive plans; the Florida Department of Community Affairs had evaluated 391 partial or completed plans; and 110 local
government units had submitted no plans at all.16 Although the
good faith of cities and counties has produced plans by over half of
them, the LGCPA provides virtually no mechanism to combat perfunctory or half-hearted compliance, since the Department's review, evaluation, and commentary procedure is merely advisory."
One incentive for adopting a comprehensive plan is the potential loss of local control over planning, since a municipality or special district that fails to meet the deadline becomes subject to the
comprehensive plan of the county. 1 ' Similarly, the Department will
provide a comprehensive plan for any county that fails to prepare
and adopt one by the deadline. For the actual work performed in
preparing such a plan, the Department may request payment from
as much as fifty percent of certain state funds allocated to a local
government that fails to designate a local planning agency.1 ' But if
the city or county designates a local planning agency and then
takes no other steps to adopt a plan by the deadline, the Department is without authority under the LGCPA to charge the local
government for its planning services. 0 .
Although the LGCPA is devoid of other penalties for noncompliance, enforcement remains possible through citizens who, with
proper standing,2" may attack local zoning ordinances or developcity drafted its parks and open space element with equal precision: "The continued maintenance and improvement of parks and recreation areas will contribute to planning goals by
fostering low population densities, maintaining high aesthetic standards, creating scenic vistas, improving neighborhood characteristics and by assuring healthy and aesthetically pleasing surroundings." Memorandum from Div. of Land Resource Management, Fla. Dep't of
Community Affairs, to Roy P. Cookston (Mar. 1981). These meaningless platitudes may well

rise to haunt city officials who later seek to translate them into bricks and mortar or to sell
bond issues for specific capital improvements.

16. Interview with Michael Garretson, Director, Div. of Local Resource Management,
Fla. Dep't of Community Affairs (Apr. 1981). As of the date of publication, however, all but
25 cities and 1 county had taken some steps toward compliance.
17. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(1), (2), (5) (1979).
18. Id. § 163.3167. This loss of control is not a great incentive, however, because a local
government that fails to adopt its own plan remains free to amend the plan imposed by the

next highest governmental entity. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 080-95 (Dec. 5, 1980).
19. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(9) (1979).

20. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 080-95 (Dec. 5, 1980).
21. The Department of Community Affairs has proposed legislation to afford any citizen of the state the right to seek an injunction against any local government unit (regardless
of whether the citizen resides there) that attempts to adopt a plan not meeting LGCPA
requirements, or that fails to implement an adopted plan. Interview, supra note 16; see
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ment permits by alleging deviation from the comprehensive plan.
The LGCPA does not require the local government to adopt zoning
ordinances as part of the land use element, but it does define zoning ordinances and building permits as "land development regulations" for purposes of requiring review and recommendation by the
local planning agency. Although this provision of the LGCPA
awaits judicial interpretation, it apparently requires the local planning agency or zoning board to find some supportive statement or
objective in the plan before recommending even the most minor
zoning amendment.2 2 If the board bases its recommendation on
some vague or meaningless platitude in the plan, then the court
might overturn the ordinance under its power to review "the appropriateness and completeness of the comprehensive plan . . . or
elements thereof in relation to the governmental action or development regulation under consideration." 2 Because the LGCPA instructs the courts to construe its provisions broadly, citizens thus
have new grounds to complain of zoning enactments if the comprehensive plan is silent or sloppily drafted. 4
Careful draftsmanship is also important because the procedure
for amending an adopted comprehensive plan is elaborate and
cumbersome.25 An exception to this complexity is the LGCPA provision permitting a simple majority of the local governing body to
amend the future land use element of the plan, after mailing notice
to the affected property owners, if the amendment affects less than
five percent of the total land area in the governmental unit." At
notes 89-93 and accompanying text infra.
22. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(2)(a) (1979) provides in part:

After a comprehensive plan for the area, or element or portion thereof, is
adopted by the governing body, no land development regulation, land development code, or amendment thereto shall be adopted by the governing body until
such regulation, code, or amendment has been referred to the local planning
agency for review and recommendation as to the relationship of such proposal to

the adopted comprehensive plan or element or portion thereof.
23. Id. § 163.3194(3)(a).
24. For example, suppose the traffic circulation element of a city's comprehensive plan
provides that "commercial building density shall be maintained at current levels until a new
mass transit system is completed in 1985." The city then attempts to amend its zoning code
to eliminate setback requirements and increase floor area ratios. In a challenge to the
amendment, a court could look to the relationship of the plan to the amendment and find

the latter repugnant and void. Could the city have achieved the same result by granting
variances, since variances are neither "enactments"
163.3194(1); notes 55-72 and accompanying text infra.

nor "amendments"?

See id. §

25. For a description of the mechanics of the LGCPA amendment and adoption process, see Note, supra note 6, at 1140-45.
26. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3184(7)(b), .3187 (1979).
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first glance, this five-percent exception appears to give the governing body freedom to change one hundred percent of the plan in
twenty meetings. With a change of only a few commission or council seats, a new regime could thus threaten the permanence of a
carefully constructed, long-range comprehensive plan. But only the
land use element of the plan is subject to this simplified amendment process; the other elements of the plan require the elaborate
version.
In Wolff v. Dade County,2 7 the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, reaffirmed that the "fairly debatable" rule remains the
standard for judicial review of a local government's refusal to
amend its comprehensive plan. Because the county's plan established no criteria for the consideration of amendments, the landowner argued that his compliance with the criteria prescribed by
the county planning department required the county to reclassify
his property. Rejecting such a narrow inquiry and refusing to specify what criteria the commission must use, the court upheld the
commission's legislative decision as fairly debatable because the
entire record revealed a reasonable basis for denying the landowner's application to amend the plan.
The LGCPA produced a significant change in Florida law by
reversing the common law rule that exempted governmental entities from their own zoning restrictions when pursuing a governmental, as distinguished from a proprietary, activity. For example,
in AlA Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Brevard County,28 the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a county's zoning ordinances did not prevent it from constructing and operating a sewage treatment plant in a general use zone adjacent to the plaintiff's
mobile home park. The LGCPA effectively nullifies this holding by
requiring all development undertaken by a governmental agency to
be consistent with the comprehensive plan or element thereof that
the local government has adopted.' Unlike the AlA decision, this
LGCPA provision makes no distinction between a governmental
activity and a proprietary activity. Thus, like private landowners,
local governments may not undertake development activities unless specifically permitted by the comprehensive plan and the zon27. 370 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1979).
28. 246 So. 2d 126, 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
29. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(1) (1979). This provision conforms to the supreme court's
"prospective" view in Parkway Towers Condominium Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County,
295 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1974), that zoning ordinances should either anticipate or be duly

amended to accommodate county or municipal facilities.
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ing ordinances implementing it.
It appears that the framers of the LGCPA envisioned a broad
planning and zoning manifesto-a kind of "constitution" for future
growth. Substantial noncompliance by local governments, deadline extensions, and hastily drafted plans forecast difficulties for
that vision in the years ahead. If not properly covered in the plan,
for example, new capital improvements and recreational or transportation facilities may face lengthy delays because of broadened
citizen standing, the elaborate amendment process, and other
problems. As the deadline for final compliance approaches, time is
running out for the careful draftsmanship necessary to.avoid such
difficulties.
II.

FLEXIBLE ZONING TECHNIQUES

Various old and new labels-contract zoning, conditional zoning, incentive zoning, floating zones, planned unit developments,
and variances-describe the flexible methods that local governments use to reconcile the competing interests affected by zoning.
Through such techniques, zoning officials try to maintain a comprehensive yet dynamic zoning plan by approving proposed developments coupled with reasonable restrictions for the benefit of the
public in general and the neighboring landowners in particular.80
But the way in which the local government and the landowner
strike their bargain over such restrictions may affect the validity of
the resulting rezoning, for the courts sometimes engage in semantic
contortions to find subtle distinctions among these similar devices.
This section examines these devices and the legal pitfalls encountered when using them to ameliorate rigid zoning standards.
A.

Contract Zoning and Conditional Zoning

The Supreme Court of Florida condemned contract zoning in
1956 in Hartnett v. Austin,"1 which held unconstitutionally vague
a Coral Gables rezoning ordinance that was contingent upon the
subsequent execution of contracts between the city and the developer. The ordinance called for contracts requiring the developer to
build a wall around its proposed shopping center, to landscape a
forty-foot setback, to protect the neighbors against glare from the
30. For example, in exchange for increased density or more intensive uses, developers
often make concessions such as dedicating public streets or rights-of-way, donating school or
park sites, and increasing open space or off-street parking.
31. 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
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shopping center lights, and to pay for additional police protection.
Agreeing with the complaining neighbors that Coral Gables had illegally bargained away its municipal police powers, the supreme
court said: "[A] city cannot legislate by contract. If it could, then
each citizen would be governed by an individual rule based upon
the best deal that he could make with the governing body. 3 2 The
principal vice of the ordinance was its use of private collateral con-

tracts to impose conditions that, although intended to benefit the
public," would introduce ambiguity and destroy the comprehensive municipal zoning plan:
If each parcel of property were zoned on the basis of variables
that could enter into private contracts then the whole scheme
and objective of community planning and zoning would collapse.
The residential owner would never know when he was protected
against commercial encroachment. The commercial establishments on "Main Street" would never know when they had protection against inroads by smoke and noise producing industries.
This is so because all genuine standards would have been eliminated from the zoning ordinance. The zoning classification of
each parcel would then be bottomed on individual agreements
and private arrangements that would totally destroy uniformity.
Both the benefits of and reasons for a well-ordered comprehensive zoning scheme would be eliminated."
32. Id. at 89.
33. The court carefully pointed out that it objected not to the intended result but to
the way Coral Gables had exercised its municipal powers: "This opinion is not to be construed as being adversely critical of the policy adopted by appellants in this instance. Conceivably, if effectuated, the plan might redound to the economic benefit of the community.
We have dealt here solely with a question of municipal power, not. policy." Id. at 89-90.
34. Id. at 89. The undesirable results foreseen by the supreme court would follow not
from municipal bargaining with developers for concessions, but from municipal abandonment of uniform objective zoning standards. When a zoning amendment permits a use of
property subject to restrictions other than those applicable to other similarly classified land,
such preferential treatment arguably amounts to spot zoning and may discriminate against
neighboring landowners, absent some other justification for rezoning the property. See
Strine, The Use of Conditions in Land-Use Control, 67 DICK. L. REv. 109 (1963); note 146
and accompanying text infra.
Assuming that the developer and municipality bargain for a rezoning ordinance that is
fairly debatable and nondiscriminatory, contract zoning is nevertheless illegal when they
enter into a bilateral agreement involving reciprocal obligations. By binding itself to enact
the requested ordinance (or not to amend the existing ordinance), the municipality bypasses
the hearing phase of the legislative process. Moreover, even if the municipality holds a hearing, as in Hartnett, it cannot legally surrender its duty to keep its zoning power unfettered
and amenable to changing conditions. See Schaffer, Contract Zoning and Conditional Zoning, 11 PRAc. LAw. 43, 43-44 (May 1965); Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41
TEMP. L.Q. 267, 269-70 (1968); Note, The Validity of Conditional Zoning: A Florida Perspective, 31 U. FLA. L. REv.968, 970-72 (1979); Note, Conditional Zoning in Texas, 57 Tx.
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In 1979, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, found
no such flaw in the similar case of Broward County v. Griffey.5 5 In
Griffey, the county commission upzoned a tract for an apartment
complex of 1700 units on the condition that the landowners would
deed land to the county for roads, grant the county an option to
purchase a portion of the tract, provide for parking and green
space, and make other concessions. The owners transferred the requested parcels to the county but failed to construct their project
for over two years. During this time, the county adopted a master
plan that downzoned the tract. Rather than appeal the downzoning, the landowners sued for the return of their land, alleging that
they were involuntary participants in an illegal contract and that
the county had forced "conditional zoning" upon them."
The trial court ordered the county to return the land, but the
Fourth District reversed. Apparently equating the landowners' allegation of conditional zoning with the contract zoning found illegal in Hartnett, the Fourth District nevertheless distinguished
Hartnett because "[in the case at bar there were no private contracts negotiated and certainly no bargaining away of the police
power occurred.

'3 7

Rather, the court characterized the county and

L. REV. 829 (1979).
35. 366 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1980).
36. On appeal, the Fourth District adopted Professor Anderson's definition of conditional zoning: "A zoning amendment which permits a use of particular property in a zoning
district subject to restrictions other than those applicable to all land similarly classified is
sometimes referred to as conditional zoning." 366 So. 2d at 871 (quoting 2 R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.20 (2d ed. 1976)). This definition, however, is broad enough to
include "an inducement for the zoning change," which was the Fourth District's characterization .of the property transferred by the Griffeys. 366 So. 2d at 870.
A narrower definition of illegal conditional zoning is a rezoning ordinance that remains
ineffective until the landowner performs some act (such as developing the property as
agreed), or that reverts the property to its previous zoning classification if the developer
fails to perform within a specified period. See Schaffer, supra note 34, at 48-52. The first
alternative shares the vices of contract zoning, see note 34 supra; the reversion feature of
the second alternative, if activated, would amend the zoning code without a hearing and
would facially demonstrate "that no reason existed to rezone the property in the first instance." 1974 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 223, 224 (No. 074-142); see 1972 id. 177 (No. 072104); 1971 id. 462 (No. 071-333).
37. 366 So. 2d at 871. The Hartnett court actually condemned three wrongful municipal acts: 1) The illegal bargaining away of police power by contract; 2) The introduction of
ambiguity into an ordinance by reference to an extraneous document; and 3) The change of
zoning on an individual case basis. The frequent citation of Hartnett as authority for the
first point gives the impression that subsequent decisions, such as Griffey, have "winked" at
the Hartnett decision. See, e.g., J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, ZONING ArrACKS AND DEFENSES, THE LAW IN FLORIDA 126 (1980). Undue emphasis on the first point should not divert attention from the vice that Hartnett points out with equal clarity-the municipal attempt to solve a unique zoning situation by negotiating a "deal" with the landowner on a
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the landowners as "two parties coming to a mutually satisfactory
agreement."8 This distinction is less than convincing, since it is
difficult to understand how two parties could come to a mutually
satisfactory agreement without having negotiated a contract.8 9 A

more valuable distinction may be that the Hartnett ordinance was
conditioned upon the developer's subsequent performance of separate contracts; the Griffey ordinance contained all the terms of the
agreement, which were to be performed simultaneously with the
rezoning.40

The Griffey result is consistent with the rule in other jurisdictions, which invalidates a bilateral contract obligating the municipality to rezone in exchange for a certain performance by the depiecemeal, ad hoc basis.
This taint of dealmaking, even when intended for a worthy community purpose, has
strained Florida courts into narrow distinctions and confusing definitions in order to uphold
the resulting arrangement, or at least a part of it. For example, in New Products Corp. v.
City of North Miami, 241 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), the city agreed to rezone a parcel
for multiple family residential use and to sell it to the plaintiff purchaser for $75,000. In the
course of its specific performance suit against the city, the purchaser offered to pay the full
price for the parcel with its existing zoning. The Third District found the contract severable
and enforced the sale provisions without the illegal rezoning provisions. Similarly, in Walberg v. Metropolitan Dade County, 296 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), the Third District
upheld the county commission's refusal to roll back the permitted density on a tract developed by South Cutler Bay, Inc. Distinguishing Hartnett, the court rejected the plaintiff
neighbors' allegations of illegal contract zoning:
[I]t does not appear from this record that a private contract was made by the
County with a property owner for a change or perpetuation of zoning. In the
present instance, the most that can be said for appellants' position is that the
Commissioners may have been influenced by representations made by South
Cutler. A rule which would forbid owners from announcing concessions to the
public interest in any proceeding before a zoning authority would not be in the
best interest of the public.
Id. at 511 (citing Housing Auth. v. Richardson, 196 So. 2d 489, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) ("A
good zoning ordinance may be the product of questionable or poor motives.")).
38. 366 So. 2d at 871 (emphasis added).
39. Indeed, Griffey is arguably closer to being a "contract" zoning case than Hartnett,
since the Fourth District not only found the parties in a posture of "mutually satisfactory
agreement," but held the landowners' performance-the deed of land to the county - binding on them. The agreement, presumably negotiated by the county planning staff, appeared
to trade valuable assets for higher zoning density. That the county needed the land to build
roads, a public benefit, should not alter the result. The illegality of such an agreement is the
consideration-the government's promise, if any, to exercise its police power in a given manner. The Griffey decision, by binding the landowners while excusing the county, erodes both
the equitable principles of estoppel and rescission. But finding enforceable reciprocal covenants would have produced an equally unacceptable result, since the landowners could
freeze the zoning and bind the power of future governing bodies.
40. This reading emphasizes the narrow holding of Hartnett that the ordinance, because dependent upon the subsequent execution of private collateral contracts, lacked "the
degree of clarity and certainty that is required of municipal legislation." 93 So. 2d at 88.
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veloper." In contrast, a municipality does not illegally bargain
away its police power when it promises nothing, but unilaterally
responds to concessions proposed by the developer as inducements
to rezone.42 Typically, the developer bargains over these concessions with the municipal planning staff, who have no authority to
bind the municipality's police power, but whose expert recommendation carries great weight with zoning officials.43 Absent some
public outcry at the subsequent rezoning hearing, the municipal
zoning board reviews and usually unilaterally approves the staff's
recommendation. This procedure of staff negotiation attempts to
reconcile the landowner's interest with the public interest in land
use, while avoiding the Hartnett prohibition against compromising
municipal police power.
B. Incentive Zoning
Incentive zoning is a comparatively new technique that avoids
some of the difficulties inherent in other zoning techniques
designed to allow local governments more flexibility and discretion
in applying their zoning standards. Professor Anderson has characterized incentive zoning, also called "bonus zoning," as a "'carrotand-stick' technique which employs administrative concessions to
induce needed construction or desired features." By establishing
a set of predetermined criteria, incentive zoning provides a measure of flexibility while neatly sidestepping the tangled web of distinctions between contract and conditional zoning.
An incentive zoning ordinance specifies predetermined "tradeoffs" between two lists of development features and applies equally
to any owner and any property in the zoning district. 4" In effect,
41. See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 125 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Dade County Ass'n of Unincorporated Areas v. Board of County Comm'rs,
45 Fla. Supp. 193, 200 (Dade Cty. Ct. 1975); J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, supra note 37,
at 132.
. 43. See, e.g., Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967); Annot., supra note
41, at 144-48, 188-89.
44. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 36, at § 9.23. One should distinguish incentive zoning
from another regulatory proposal called "environmental performance zoning." Under this
proposed substitute for traditional Euclidean zoning, the permissibility of a development
would depend upon its impact on the community environment, particularly the "carrying
capacity" of the locality. See Fredland, Environmental Performance Zoning: An Emerging
Trend? 12 Ura. LAW. 678 (1980).
45. By establishing definite incentive zoning criteria that are available to all property
owners in the district, the local government has neither bargained away its police power,

enacted a vague ordinance, nor zoned on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis. See note 37 supra.
Because these criteria are uniform throughout the district, incentive zoning also survives
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the local government presents the developer a Chinese menu with
instructions to choose an item from column A (which the zoning
code does not permit) and to give the local government in return
an item from column B (which the zoning code does not require).
For example, a developer seeking to build an extra story above the
allowable height might design a pedestrian mall or provide a fountain or sculpture garden. The length of the list of choices depends
on the objectives of the governmental unit. The list may be short,
as in the New York City plan for a special theatre district that
permitted twenty percent more floor area ratio for an office building in exchange for the developer's inclusion of a legitimate theatre. 6 On the other hand, the local government might devise a
longer list of possible exchange items, assigning objective point values to each item to assure equivalent exchanges.
One might argue that incentive zoning encourages cities to enact overly restrictive zoning codes to give themselves more exchange items that developers would desire, but this argument overlooks the legislative character of zoning bodies, which respond to
political and economic pressures to keep zoning reasonable. Properly used, incentive zoning would reduce reliance on discretionary
devices such as variances and special permits, for which the local
government receives no benefit from the developer.
C.

Floating Zones and Planned Unit Developments

Floating zones and planned unit developments are two innovative devices that avoid some of the legal difficulties encountered
with contract and conditional zoning. Their effect is similar, however, in that the local government may require performance of certain conditions and impose restrictions before approving the developer's plan.
attack as discriminatory spot zoning. See note 34 supra.
46. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 1, § 81-00 (1971); see Costonis,
The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservationof Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 574, 575-77 (1972); Weinstein, How New York's Zoning Was Changed to Induce the
Construction of Legitimate Theatres, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL,

ADMINISTRATIVE, AND

Ec-

131 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
47. One such benefit from incentive zoning techniques is the preservation of historic
landmark buildings. An imaginative city council, rather than offering transferable development rights, might permit the owner to build a structure over the landmark and to support
it on the surrounding public right-of-way, provided the supports did not interfere with pedestrian or vehicular traffic. The need for uniformity, however, limits the list of possible
exchange items for incentive zoning. For example, if the city agreed to condemn an alternative site for the owner of a historic landmark in exchange for its preservation, this individual
"deal" would involve many of the problems of contract zoning.
ONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES
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Similar to the incentive zoning concept, the floating zone involves a predetermined set of criteria, established in the zoning
code but not yet affixed to any specific property. 8 Before the zoning authority will amend its zoning map and "settle" the floating
zone on a particular tract, the developer must comply with the
conditions, density, setback, height, and other specified requirements. The ordinance may require a minimum size for the proposed zone, generally five acres or more, and usually imposes conditions of the traditional Euclidean type.4 '
A planned unit development (PUD) resembles a floating zone,
but allows a mix of different uses usually not permitted in close
proximity, such as residential and commercial.20 The zoning code
may require a rezoning procedure to locate a PUD, but unlike a
floating zone, a PUD may also be an authorized use in an existing
district, or it may receive approval through a variance or special
use procedure. 1 The authorizing ordinance usually defines the requirements and objectives only in general terms, relying on the developer's ingenuity to devise a combination of uses acceptable to
the zoning authority.
In City of Miami Beach v. Breitbart,e2 the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, upheld PUD zoning as a cure for lower
density zoning previously invalidated. In the earlier case, the Third
District had ordered the city to upzone the property from an arbitrary density classification of fourteen units per acre. 3 When the
city responded with a PUD classification permitting twenty-three
units per acre, the trial court struck it down again, finding that the
PUD zoning "could effectively deny the plaintiff the use of his
property. 5 4 The Third District reversed, finding that the city's rezoning was fairly debatable and had complied with the earlier
mandate.
48. See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 95 (1977).
49. Floating zones are quite similar to "special exceptions," which permit certain uses

of property in otherwise restricted districts when the owner satisfies an administrative body
that his plan meets the requirements specified in the zoning code. See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra
note 36, at § 9.17. One distinction between them is that when floating zones settle, they
change the zoning map. See Annot., supra note 48, at 107-09.
50. See Planned Unit Developments and FloatingZones, 7 RE.AL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
61 (1972) (report of subcommittee of ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
on the validity of these two devices); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 888 (1972).

51. See Annot., supra note 48, at 111.
52. 358 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
53. 280 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
54. 358 So. 2d at 566.
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D. Variances
Like the Ten Commandments, many zoning ordinances take a
rigid "thou shalt not" approach to the regulation of human conduct.55 Some such ordinances contain embedded fossils - anachronistic land use restraints, once considered sacrosanct, that have
lost their justification as conditions changed.5 6 The variance procedure is one method to which landowners resort for relief from
these anachronisms and other onerous restrictions.
Yet the use of improper standards for granting variances can
often lead to abuse of the procedure.5 7 A county or municipal zoning authority may permit a variance from its zoning regulations if
literal enforcement of the regulations would impose an unnecessary
hardship that is unique to a particular property and not shared
generally by other property owners in the area.58 A hardship variance is improper when "the use to be authorized thereby will alter
the essential character of the locality, or interfere with the zoning
plan for the area and with rights of owners of other property."5' 9
In City of Coral Gables v. Geary,60 an unusual parcel in the
shape of a triangle presented a "classic" hardship case because this
peculiar physical characteristic made development in compliance
55. Professor Anderson describes zoning codes as having a basically negative impact. 2
R. ANDERSON, supra note 36, at § 9.23.
56. See Address by Fred H. Bair, What Zoning Should and Should Not Be, delivered
before the Florida Planning and Zoning Association, in Orlando, Fla. (Oct. 5, 1980). Bair
contends that the early justification for extensive side and back yards, at least in the South,
was to provide room for a subsistence garden and to keep the smokehouse away from the
main residence. Single-family detached residences later evolved into a suburban ideal. Bair
also notes the proposal by the Anchorage, Alaska, planning board to permit homeowners to
construct garages at their front lot lines to reduce the area .they would have to clear from
snow. Anchorage, Alaska, Proposed Zoning Ordinance Technical Report 64-1 (1964). Horrified residents rose up to defeat the proposal because their inherited model of suburbia dictated the preservation of front yards from encroachment, although no one could remember
why. See F. BAIR, PLANNING CITIEs 377 (1978).
57. Part of the blame for abuse of the variance procedure lies with planners who seek
an uncomplicated, easily administered zoning code that leaves the hard issues for resolution
on an ad hoc basis. For a discussion of the use of discretionary zoning power to achieve
flexibility, as well as the difficulty of ad hoc handling of zoning matters, see Freilich &
Quinn, Effectiveness of Flexible and Conditional Zoning Techniques, in PLANNING, ZONING
& EMINENT DOMAIN INSTITUTE 167, 193 (1979) (criticizing the use of the "low-profile" variance procedure rather than a more complex bonus system to achieve beneficial goals, such
as a public housing project).
58. Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 116 So. 2d
773 (Fla. 1959). The appropriate remedy for a hardship common to the area would be to
rezone the area rather than to grant a variance.
59. Id. at 852.
60. 383 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (Schwartz, J.).
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with city setback restrictions impossible. Conceding the uniqueness
of the tract, the city nevertheless denied the variance on the
ground that Geary had created his own hardship by purchasing it
with knowledge of the existing building restrictions. 1 The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, rejected the city's argument, holding that here the hardship arose not from "the conduct or. . . selforiginated expectations of any of its owners or buyers," but from
the unique features of the property alone. 2 Because the enactment
of the setback lines had entitled the previous owner of the tract to
a hardship variance, Geary did not lose that right simply by
purchasing the property with knowledge of the restriction."
The misapplication of the rule denying variances for "self-created" hardships derives from cases involving purchasers who, with
knowledge of existing restrictions, nevertheless paid a premium
price for land and gambled that obtaining a hardship variance
would increase its value.' Language in these opinions arguably
supports the city's position in Geary that one who purchases with
knowledge of existing restrictions has created his own hardship.
This reading, however, confuses hardship to property with personal hardship. Those decisions actually turned on the absence of
any hardship unique to the particular parcels, in contrast to the
personal disappointment of the purchasers' economic expectations.6 ' A true "self-created" hardship would arise only if, after enactment of the zoning restriction, the owner or his predecessor in
interest created some unusual condition or circumstance unique to
that parcel.06
Even if the hardship is not self-created, a variance "generally
is not justified unless the land can not yield a reasonable return
61. Id. at 1128. The city also made this "self-created hardship" argument in the similar
case of Anon v. City of Coral Gables, 336 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), which involved a
variance for a lot platted with a 41.44-foot frontage 12 years before the city enacted a 50foot minimum frontage requirement. The court ordered the variance granted because the
purchaser had no knowledge of the restriction when he acquired the property. Id. at 422.
62. 383 So. 2d at 1128.
63. Id. at 1128-29.
64. See Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957); Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So.
2d 849, 852 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 116 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1959).
65. Cf. Burger King Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 349 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 3d DCA
1977) ("economic disadvantage" is insufficient hardship for variance).
66. See 383 So. 2d at 1128-29. For example, a property owner might subdivide a larger
lot and sell a portion, leaving himself a triangular parcel. It is doubtful, however, that the
city would approve the subdivision if its code would prohibit construction on the remaining
parcel. It remains an open question whether the city, in approving a subdivision under such
circumstances, would estop itself from later denying a variance for that parcel.
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when used only for purposes authorized in its present zoning.

'6 7

Except in unusual cases like Geary, setback and frontage restrictions rarely impose a hardship severe enough to meet this strict
standard. For this reason, some zoning ordinances, such as the
Metropolitan Dade County Code, distinguish between "use vari-

ances" and "non-use variances."

8

A use variance permits a use of

land other than that prescribed in the zoning regulations and in-

cludes density changes. 69 A non-use variance, on the other hand,
"involves matters such as setback lines, frontage requirements,

subdivision regulations, height limitations, lot size restrictions,
yard requirements and other variances which have no relation to
change of use of the property in question.

70

Although an applicant

for a use variance still must show an unnecessary hardship to the
land, the ordinance expressly does not require such a showing for
approval of a non-use variance.7 1 By recognizing this distinction,
the ordinance exempts adjustments of minor consequence from an

otherwise harsh rule without threatening the overall comprehensiveness required of the zoning plan.s
67. Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 116 So. 2d
773 (Fla. 1959).
68. METRo DADE CourY, FLA., CODE § 33-311(e) (1978). Absent a distinction between a
use and non-use variance in the applicable zoning code, the courts require a showing of
hardship as in the Geary case. See, e.g., Hemisphere Equity Realty Co. v. Key Biscayne
Property Taxpayers Ass'n, 369 So. 2d 996, 1001-02 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Allstate Mortgage
Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, 308 So. 2d 629, 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
69. METRO DADE CouNrY, FLA., CODE § 33-311(e)(1) (1978).
70. Id. § 33-311(e)(2). Such restrictions are commonly known as "bulk" or "area"
restrictions.
71. Compare id. § 33-311(e)(1) with id. § 33-311(e)(2). The applicant must show:
that the non-use variance maintains the basic intent and purpose of the zoning,
subdivision and other land use regulations, which is to protect the general welfare of the public, particularly as it affects the stability and appearance of the
community and provided that the [non-use] variance will be otherwise compatible with the surrounding land uses and would not be detrimental to the community. No showing of unnecessary hardship to the land is required.
Id. § 33-311(e)(2).
72. Coral Gables, in contrast, forbids use variances entirely and permits other variances
only upon a showing of seven factors, including persuading the Board of Adjustment "(tihat
literal interpretation of the provisions of the Zoning Code would deprive the applicant of
rights commonly enjoyed by other properties in the same zoning district . . . and would
work an unnecessary and undue hardship on the applicant." CORAL GABLES, FLA., ZONING
CODE § 12.07(d) (1978). The city zoning code defines unnecessary hardship as "[a]rduous
restrictions on the uses of a particular property which are unique and distinct from that of
adjoining property owners in the same zoning district." Id. § 2.364.01. Despite the severity
of this language, developers and homeowners routinely seek and receive variances based on
a mere showing of practicality or desirability.
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STANDING OF NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATIONS

The issue of standing to contest zoning decisions is, in the
words of Chief Justice Sundberg, an "area of the law [that] appears to be characterized by instability. ' 7' That issue manifested
itself most recently in a series of cases on the standing of neighborhood, community, or civic organizations to participate in zoning
controversies. Although such organizations rarely own property in
their own right, their membership typically includes property owners affected by zoning decisions.
To achieve standing in state court, such organizations must
meet one of three tests set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida
in Renard v. Dade County.7 4 First, for standing to remedy or pre-

vent breaches of a valid zoning ordinance, the complaining party
"must allege and prove special damages peculiar to himself differing in kind as distinguished from damages differing in degree suffered by the community as a whole." 7 5 Second, for standing to attack a validly enacted zoning ordinance as an unreasonable
exercise of legislative power, one must have "a legally recognizable
interest, which is adversely affected by the proposed zoning action. '76 Finally, "[a]ny affected resident, citizen, or property owner
of the governmental unit" has standing to attack a zoning ordi73. Skaggs-Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082, 1086 (Fla. 1978).
74. 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1972). For a fuller discussion of the Renard case, see Rhodes &
Haigler, Land Use Controls, 1977 Developments in Florida Law, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1117,
1118-20 (1978).
75. 261 So. 2d at 835 (quoting Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So. 2d 132, 135 (Fla. 1958)).
Typically, only adjoining property owners or those in the immediate vicinity (i.e., across the
street) can show such special damages. Id. at 834, 835, 838. The supreme court has recognized one exception to this rule in the case of regulated alcoholic beverage dealers. See
Skaggs-Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082, 1090-91 (Fla. 1978); Rayan Corp.
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 356 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
76. 261 So. 2d at 838. Other members of the affected neighborhood may share this recognizable interest in common with the complainant, "but not every resident and property
owner of a municipality can, as a general rule, claim such an interest." Id. at 837. In determining the sufficiency of the complainant's interest, the court considers factors such as the
proximity of his property to the rezoned tract, the character of the neighborhood (including
restrictive covenants and setback lines), the proposed change, and the entitlement of the
complainant to receive notice of the hearing under the zoning ordinance. Id.
As noted by the Renard court, the notice requirements of a zoning ordinance do not
control the standing question. Id. Notice of a zoning hearing mailed to property owners as a
courtesy, but not as a prerequisite to the validity of the hearing, is even less likely to confer
standing on the recipient. In F & R Builders, Inc. v. Durant, 390 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA
1980), the court denied standing to a property owner who received a courtesy notice but
whose name did not thereby appear in the record of the zoning appeals board hearing, a
prerequisite to standing as an aggrieved party under the applicable zoning code. See METRO
DADE CouNrrY, FLA., CODE § 33-313 (1980).
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nance that is void because improperly enacted.7
Neighborhood organizations have little difficulty establishing
standing to challenge a procedurally invalid zoning enactment
under the third Renard test. For example, in Save Brickell Avenue, Inc. v. City of Miami,7 8 a nonprofit corporation organized to
safeguard neighborhood zoning had standing to assert that a city
zoning ordinance was void or invalid because the "required notice
was not given."7' 9 The District Court of Appeal, Third District, relied on its earlier decision in Upper Keys Citizens Association v.
Wedel,80 which recognized the standing of a private, nonprofit citizens' corporation to challenge a variance granted at a closed, unrecorded, and unadvertised meeting between the county zoning
board and the developer of a planned unit development, in violation of both the county zoning regulations and the state "Sunshine

Law.",s
In both decisions, however, the court was careful to note that
the neighborhood organizations had standing only to test the valid-

ity of the enactment.82 A leading illustration of this limitation is
Hemisphere Equity Realty Co. v. Key Biscayne Property Taxpayers Association.8" In that case, the Third District denied a neighborhood organization standing to appeal a county commission decision granting non-use variances to a developer.84 But individual
77. 261 So. 2d at 838. This rule of standing to challenge procedural defects may not
apply to declaratory actions, in contrast to certiorari review, at least in the Second District.
In Sumter County v. Davis, 356 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), an owner of real property
located within the county sued to declare invalid two county zoning ordinances allegedly
enacted without complying with certain statutory formalities. Without mentioning Renard,
the appellate court held that the landowner lacked standing for declaratory relief because
his complaint failed to allege "that any right of the appellee has been invaded or affected by
the ordinance." Id. at 900.
78. 393 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
79. Id. at 1198 (quoting Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d at 838).
80. 341 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
81. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1979).
82. 393 So. 2d at 1198 n.2; 341 So. 2d at 1064. The neighborhood association's allegation in Save Brickell Avenue that the "required notice was not given" did not bar it from
challenging other procedural defects as well. In a subsequent controversy between several of
the same parties, the Third District clarified that it had not meant to limit the association's
standing to the notice issue alone:
An affected citizen such as Save Brickell Avenue, Inc., has standing to attack the
resolution on the ground that it is void or invalid by reason of departure from
any essential procedure preceding its enactment. It may, in short, attack how the
resolution was enacted, but not what was enacted.
Save Brickell Ave., Inc. v. City of Miami, 395 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
83. 369 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
84. Id. at 1001. The Third District upheld the circuit court's reversal of the county
commission on the merits of the individual plaintiffs' suit because the developer failed to
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property owners within the required notice area met the special

damages requirement of the first Renard test "because of the proximity of their property to the subject property, the character of the
neighborhood, and the type of zoning proposed.""'
Similarly, in Chabau v. Dade County,86 developers sought a
writ of prohibition challenging the jurisdiction of the county com-

mission to hear an administrative appeal by the same Key Biscayne neighborhood organization from a zoning appeals board decision that had approved variances sought by the developers.
Relying on Hemisphere Equity, the Third District pointed out
that the association lacked standing to sue in state court unless the
association, in contrast to its members, had suffered some special

injury. In granting the writ, the court declined to prescribe a lower
standing requirement for administrative appeals, absent an
amendment of the county zoning code making representative associations aggrieved parties: "If Dade County wishes to liberalize
access to its local tribunals, it may undertake to do So."'87 Following the Chabau decision, the county amended its ordinance to provide for appeals to the county commission by "neighborhood, community and civic associations."8 8
Similarly, the legislature may statutorily abrogate the special
injury requirement for judicial review. For example, in Florida
Wildlife Federationv. State Department of Environmental Regulation,8 9 the supreme court found that the legislature, by not mentioning special injury when it authorized suits by "citizens" under
a new environmental protection statute, e° had intended that the
demonstrate the requisite hardship for a variance under METRO DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE §
33-311(e) (1977), which at the time in question did not distinguish use variances from nonuse variances. 369 So. 2d 996. See notes 68-72 and accompanying text supra.
85. 369 So. 2d at 1001.
86. 385 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
87. Id. at 130.
88. Metro Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 80-88, § 1 (Sept. 2, 1980) (amending METRO
DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 33-313 (1978)). Since this enlargement of standing applies to
local government appeals and cannot bind the courts, it is likely that an unfortunate appellant who fails at the local government level will be unable to take the matter to circuit court
unless he meets the special interest or special damage tests.
Other cities, such as Coral Gables, extended standing not only to neighborhood associations but to members of various city boards and to individual commissioners. CORAL GABLES,
FLA., ZONING CODE § 14.01 (1981). An interesting question is whether, by reason of his office

and sworn duty, such a city official would have an adversely affected special interest sufficient for judicial standing, in contrast to the possessory or proprietary interest ordinarily
required.
89. 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980).
90. Environmental Protection Act of 1971, 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-343, § 2 (codified at
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special injury rule not apply.9 1 Moreover, because it created new

substantive rights, the statute was not an impermissible legislative
incursion into the supreme court's power to adopt rules of practice
and procedure.2 To challenge the merits of zoning enactments,
neighborhood organizations may thus find it necessary to resort to
the legislative process to overcome the Renard barrier to
standing. e3

IV.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents a local government from downzoning a tract when an owner relying "(1) in good
faith (2) upon some act or omission of the government (3) has
made such a substantial change in position or incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable
and unjust to destroy the right he acquired.""" As a basic corollary
of the rules of fair play, equitable estoppel applies when a local
government induces a developer to step "onto a welcome mat" of
favorable zoning and then tries "to snatch the mat away."9 5 Equitable estoppel is an exception to the general rule that a mere
purchase of property, without more, creates no vested right to a
particular existing zoning classification.6
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, permitted a
foreclosing mortgagee to assert equitable estoppel in Jones v. U.S.
Steel Credit Corp.'9 In this case of "whipsaw" zoning, the Pinellas
County Commission upzoned a landowner's tract valued at
$475,000 under the prior classification, facilitating its sale to a developer for $2,300,000. Before loaning the purchase money to the
§ 403.412(2) (1979)).
91. 390 So. 2d at 67. Because nonprofit corporations have the same capacity to sue and
be sued as do natural persons, FLA. STAT. § 617.021 (1979), the court concluded that the
legislative grant of standing to "citizens" also applied to the corporate plaintiff in this case.
390 So. 2d at 68.
92. 390 So. 2d at 66-67; see Kramer, Halpern, & Robbins, Constitutional Law, 1979
Developments in Florida Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 597, 602-08 (1980).
93. The Florida Wildlife case, however, indicates that unless the legislative body simultaneously creates a new "substantive" right, then mere zoning code provisions purporting to
accord standing to a broad new category of persons may be insufficient to create standing
for judicial review.
94. City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So. 2d 867, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA
1973), affd in part & rev'd in part, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976). See Sakolsky v. City of Coral
Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963); Rhodes, Vested Rights Update, 54 FLA. B.J. 787 (1980).
95. Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
96. See City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., 77 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1954); Epifano v.
Town of Indian River Shores, 379 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
97. 382 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
FLA. STAT.
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developer in reliance on the rezoning, the mortgagee made the
commissioners aware of the transaction, and the commissioners reaffirmed their decision. When the mortgagee foreclosed on the
property two years later, the county commission promptly
downzoned the tract back to its original classification. Under the
extraordinary facts of this case, the court held the county equitably estopped from downzoning the property because the mortgagee
had made the loan in good faith reliance on the upzoning ordinance. Although the doctrine is ordinarily available only to property owners, the court held that equity and good conscience permitted the foreclosing mortgagee to stand in the shoes of the
developer. Such equitable subrogation, however, should not have
increased the mortgagee's rights beyond those of the developer,
who had commenced no construction or other use of the property
in reliance on the upzoning.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, refused to apply
equitable estoppel in Dade County v. United Resources, Inc.,"
when the county commission determined that a proposed large
housing project was exempt from statutory provisions governing
developments of regional impact (DRI)." The commission's resolution, however, expressly noted that the DRI exemption would not
predetermine issues pertaining to the developer's future rezoning
applications, which the county eventually denied. Reversing the
trial court, the Third District found that the county's clear warning made equitable estoppel inapplicable in this case and that the
denial of rezoning was fairly debatable.
Although municipal officials gave no such clear warning in
Smith v. City of Clearwater,1" the developer nevertheless failed to
prove the requisite elements for equitable estoppel. In that case,
members of the city planning department suggested that the
developer first go to the Division of State Planning to secure DRI
approval, which they privately urged the Division to withhold. By
the time the developer's amended proposal finally received state
approval, the city had proposed amendments to its zoning code
that would downzone the property. The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that the city planners' behind-the-scenes opposition to the project had not affirmatively misled the developer,
who also had failed to show a substantial change of position. 101
98. 374 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
99. See FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1979).
100. 383 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
101. Id. at 686. Even though the developer made no showing of substantial expendi-

ZONING LAW

19811

Even if local officials affirmatively approve a construction project, however, the estoppel doctrine will not operate to sanction
acts prohibited by law. In Dade County v. Gayer,0 2 the county
building and zoning department issued landowners a building permit for a coral rock wall with a ten-foot setback, but the landowners built it in the public right-of-way. The trial court held the
county estopped from ordering removal of the wall and the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed. Estoppel does not apply
to transactions forbidden by statute, and in this case, a county ordinance forbade building a structure in a mapped street.
V.

DISCRIMINATION BY POPULATION CONTROL

A.

Boca Raton Building "Cap"

Local governments have experimented with new zoning ordinances designed to control city growth. Like all zoning regulations,
growth controls "must find their justification in some aspect of the
police power, asserted for the public welfare."1 03 Permissible police-power objectives include "the preservation of . . .small town
character and the avoidance of the social and environmental
problems caused by an uncontrolled growth rate.' 10 4 A municipality may, within limits, provide for phased growth and development
in accordance with the availability of essential municipal services
and facilities. 0 5 But if an absolute "cap" or moratorium restricting
the number of dwelling units bears no rational relationship to the
public health, morals, safety, and welfare, then such an arbitrary
and unreasonable ordinance violates due process of law.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, struck down an
arbitrary density cap on due process grounds in City of Boca Raton v.Boca Villas Corp.'" and its companion case, City of Boca
tures, the court opined that he would have been entitled to a building permit if the rezoning
ordinance had not already been "pending" when he received DRI approval. Id. at 689.
102. 388 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
103. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
104. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
105. Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). The Ramapo plan permitted subdivision development
in advance of the town's 18-year capital improvements schedule if the developer agreed to
provide such essential services. See generally Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the
Tempo and Sequence of Land Development, 26 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1974); Annot., 63
A.L.R.3d 1184 (1975).
106. 371 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 765 (Fla.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 86 (1980).
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Raton v. Arvida Corp.1 07 By initiative and referendum, the citizens
of Boca Raton had amended their city charter to limit the total
number of dwelling units within the city to 40,000, forbidding further building permits beyond that limit.108 In formulating the cap,
its proponents had never consulted the city planning department,
whose officials were unable at trial to show any compelling reason
for a permanent fixed limitation, other than community choice.
The trial court found that the testimony and the city's "after-thefact" studies of the cap demonstrated no rational relationship to a
valid municipal objective, such as adequate utility systems, uncrowded schools, municipal fiscal stability, regional water resources, air quality and noise levels, or preservation of the city's
comprehensive plan. 109 The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed the trial court, finding that there had been substantial competent evidence to support its finding of no rational relationship.110 The appellate court found it unnecessary to consider
the effect of the ordinance on specific parcels and thus did not
reach the plaintiff's confiscation claim or the application of the
fairly debatable rule. 1
107. 371 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 765 (Fla.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 86 (1980).
108. The city council implemented the charter amendment by reducing the
density for
all multifamily zoning categories by 50% across the board, and by limiting single-family
density to the average pre-amendment level. The court found that this ordinance violated
both due process and equal protection. 371 So. 2d at 155.
109. Id. at 155-57. The trial court acknowledged that the cap device could conceivably
be "a firm planning goal embodied in legislation," but held that "legislation as far reaching
as this Cap should not be adopted by trial and error." Id. at 157. For a discussion of the
hazards of adopting zoning ordinances by referendum, see notes 121-42 and accompanying
text infra.
110. 371 So. 2d at 157. We are thus left to speculate whether a Florida court would
approve an absolute cap making residentially zoned land unbuildable, if expert testimony
demonstrates that the cap on the number of dwelling units is vital to the public welfare.
Other jurisdictions have approved municipal growth limitations less absolute than the Boca
Raton cap. See cases cited notes 104 & 105 supra.
111. 371 So. 2d at 157-59. "The fairly debatable rule applies to the application of the
ordinance and does not modify the requirement that the ordinance itself and the application thereof must have a reasonable relationship to the health, safety, morals or general
welfare." Id. at 159 (quoting Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d 214, 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)). The
court opined, however, that if it had reached that issue, the mere introduction of expert
testimony in support of the cap would not necessarily make the issue fairly debatable. "If it
did,' every zoning case would be fairly debatable and the City would prevail simply by submitting an expert who testified favorably to the City's position." Id. For a discussion of
confiscatory zoning, see notes 143-58 and accompanying text infra.
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B.

Coral Gables "Lot-Splitting" Ordinance

A more successful technique for controlling population density
has been the prescription of minimum sizes for residential lots. 1 2
The Coral Gables "lot-splitting" ordinance, first enacted in 1973, is
one variation on this theme. 1 " As an experimental attempt to limit
the number of residences built within the city by restricting the
traditional right to build on any legally platted lot, the ordinance
has spawned three recent decisions.
When laying out Coral Gables in the 1920's, the original developer had platted thousands of 50-foot-wide lots. Many purchasers
bought three or four lots and built their residences extending
across the lot lines, creating a city of graceful homes with generous
spacing between them. As property values in the city soared, it became attractive for speculators to tear down the older residences
and to sell the underlying multiple lots as individual building sites.
If unchecked, this process could destroy neighborhood integrity,
vastly increase population density, and strain city services. The intent of the 1973 ordinance was plain and straightforward: a singlefamily residence, once constructed on two or more platted lots, forever tied the lots together as a single building site. No permit
would issue to replace a demolished or removed residence with
more than one building, even though the site would revert to three
legally platted lots.
In City of Coral Gables v. Puiggros,1 1 4 a homeowner removed
from one of his underlying lots a part of a detached garage that did
not appear on city records. Unaware of this demolition, the city
zoning board approved the lot as a separate building site, provided
the owner removed minor encroachments by the remaining residence. After the owner spent $3000 correcting these encroachments, irate neighbors described the prior demolition to the zoning
board, which withdrew site approval. When the owner sued for the
112. See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 716 (1964). A minimum lot size of several acres,

however, may effectively place the cost of acquisition beyond the means of lower income
groups. Such "large-lot" zoning may be vulnerable to attack as "exclusionary" zoning. See,
e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336

A.2d 713 (1975); Aloi, Goldberg, & White, Racial and Economic Segregation By Zoning:
Death Knell for Home Rule? 1969 U. TOL. L. REV. 65; Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary
Zoning Practices: An Examination of the Current Controversy, 25 VAND. L. Rav. 1111
(1972); Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYAcus. L. Rav. 509 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84

HAv.L. Rav. 1645 (1971).
113. CoaAiL GABLES, FLA., ZONING CODE § 8.02 (1980).
114. 376 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
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building permit, the trial court granted him summary judgment,
holding the city equitably estopped because the owner spent funds
in reliance on the first approval. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, reversed without approving or disapproving of the
ordinance, finding unresolved issues in the record. On remand, the
trial court again held for the homeowner, finding the ordinance inapplicable because a "single-family residence" as defined in the
city code did not include this detached garage.11
The Third District had previously refused to reach the constitutionality of the lot-splitting ordinance in King v. City of Coral
Gables.1 6 In King, the plaintiff landowners attacked the ordinance
as arbitrary and unconstitutional as applied to three unimproved
50-foot lots, which had been the site of the plaintiffs' home before
its accidental destruction by fire. The court construed the statute
as inapplicable to this casualty loss, holding that the intent of the
ordinance was to prevent the voluntary or intentional demolition
of residences on large sites by developers who would then build
117
more residences on smaller lots.

Curiously, the Third District later relied on the King decision
in approving the lot-splitting ordinance as a proper exercise of the
police power in Holladay v. City of Coral Gables." 8 The city zoning administrator had advised the prospective purchasers of a residence located on two 100-foot lots that they could demolish it and
build two new residences because the ordinance at that time applied only to 50-foot lots. The zoning board then reversed the administrator, but the purchasers proceeded to close on the property
and unsuccessfully appealed to the city commission. After the purchasers failed to seek timely review of the commission's decision,
the city amended the lot-splitting ordinance and deleted its reference to the size of the lots it affected.
When the purchasers sued for declaratory relief, the Third
District held that "what the plaintiffs sought to do with respect to
this parcel was clearly and expressly prohibited"11 9 under the
amended ordinance, which was controlling at the time the plaintiffs filed suit. The court found it immaterial that the city commis115.
1981).
116.
117.
118.

Puiggros v. City of Coral Gables, No. 78-4552 CA 10 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. May 13,
363 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979).
Id. at 392.
382 So. 2d 92, 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).

119. Id. at 96. The court quickly rejected the purchasers' equitable estoppel argument
because the zoning board had reversed the administrator several weeks before the plaintiffs
consummated their purchase.
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sion might have improperly applied the former 50-foot ordinance
to the 100-foot lots, since that decision had become final and binding on the purchasers. Indeed, the commissioners' difference of
opinion about whether the former ordinance applied to such lots
was a "reasonable basis for the rewriting of that zoning provision
. . .to remove the ambiguity and make clear that the zoning pol-

icy expressed in the earlier ordinance was applicable to such imregard to the amount of foot frontproved multilot parcels without
1 20
age of the lots involved.P
VI.

ZONING BY REFERENDUM

Another form of discrimination can result from the initiative
and referendum process, which has increased in popularity as a
method whereby the will of citizen groups can override the legislative decisions of state and local governments.1 21 When applied to
zoning decisions that govern individual property rights, the referendum process can deny procedural due process and produce discriminatory spot zoning in violation of equal protection. The affected property owner argues that the referendum deprives him of
a proper forum to air and compromise the issues before a zoning
board or city council." 2 It denies him the benefit of the staff's expertise and the board's due regard for preserving a comprehensive
zoning plan. The referendum is least appropriate and most discriminatory in a zoning decision that affects only a single owner or
a single tract. Such decisions are more adjudicatory than legislative
in nature, in contrast to the adoption of a general comprehensive
zoning ordinance. Thus, courts often determine the appropriateness of a referendum for deciding a zoning controversy by examin120. Id. at 97.
121. A referendum, however, is far more than an expression of ambiguously
founded neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating through its voters-an exercise by the voters of their traditional right through direct legislation

to override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public
interest.
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir.
1970), quoted in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (1976).
For background on the current resurgence of the use of initiatives and referenda, see

Sirica, The Constitutionalityof the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IowA L. REv. 637 (1980);
Comment, The Direct Initiative Process:Have UnconstitutionalMethods of Presentingthe
Issues Prejudiced Its Future? 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 433 (1979); Note, ConstitutionalConstraints on Initiatives and Referendum, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1143 (1979).

122. One should distinguish the desirable "give and take" of the legislative process
from the "dealmaking" condemned in contract zoning cases. See notes 31-43 and accompanying text supra.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:581

ing the legislative or quasi-judicial nature of the decision. 12 3
In City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael,12 4 the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, in 1972 held that the referendum provision
of the city charter applied to an amendatory zoning ordinance that
would have upzoned a Cocoplum Beach tract for more intensive
development. The court characterized the rezoning decision as legislative, relying upon a supreme court pronouncement in Schauer
v. City of Miami Beach:'2 5 "It is obvious to us that the enactment
of the original zoning ordinance was a legislative function and we
cannot reason that the amendment of it was of different character.'

26

The referendum procedure was thus merely an alternative

exercise of the city's legislative power and did not in itself violate
due process or equal protection.

27

But in 1976, in Andover Development Corp. v. City of New
Smyrna Beach, 2 8 the District Court of Appeal, First District, expressly rejected the Carmichael case and the argument that an
amendment to a zoning ordinance is necessarily legislative if the
original ordinance was legislative. 29 In Andover, a citizens group
passed a referendum rescinding the PUD zoning approved by the
city commission for the developer's tract. The First District found
that rezoning this tract by referendum violated due process by
overruling the fact-finding function of the planning commission as
well as the administrative decision of the city commission. 8 0 Quoting extensively from decisions in other jurisdictions, the court
found that the role of the hearing and fact-finding tribunal that
decided particular zoning controversies was administrative or
123. See, e.g., Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973);
West v. Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502
P.2d 327 (1972). See generally Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 991 (1976); Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 1031
(1976).
124. 256 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
125. 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959).
126. Id. at 839, quoted in 256 So. 2d at 408. The Schauer case involved not a referendum, but an alleged conflict of interest in a city council's decision to upzone a large area for
hotel development when one of the councilmen owned a tract in the area. Id.
127. 256 So. 2d at 409. The Carmichaelcourt relied on James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971), which involved no procedural due process issue, and Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal.
505, 253 P. 932 (1927), which questioned the wisdom of using the referendum "in matters of
zoning when the effect may be more acutely felt in a given district than by the community
at large." Id. at 517, 253 P. at 937.
128. 328 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
129. Id. at 235. The Andover court pointed out that more recent California cases had
repudiated the approach taken in the Dwyer case relied on by the Carmichael court. Id.
130. Id. at 238.
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quasi-judicial; such matters were improper for decision by
referendum."'
Four months after the Andover decision, the Supreme Court
of the United States reversed an Ohio case relied upon by the First
District, Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake.3 2 The
Supreme Court of Ohio had held that rezoning was indeed a legislative function, which was unlawfully delegated through the referendum process. Because they lacked standards to guide their decision, the voters would be exercising the police power in an
arbitrary and capricious manner. 88s In a six-to-three decision delivered by Chief Justice Burger, the Court found the delegation doctrine inapplicable to a referendum, which is "a power reserved by
the people to themselves."'8 Quoting Justice Black, the Chief Justice characterized the referendum procedure as "a classic demonstration of 'devotion to democracy,' "5 and noted that "there is no
more advance assurance that a legislative body will act by conscientiously applying consistent standards than there is with respect
to voters."' 3 6
The Chief Justice was careful to note, however, that the referendum process would not immunize the zoning ordinance from a
substantive due process challenge, which the developer had not
raised: "If the substantive result of the referendum is arbitrary and
capricious, bearing no relation to the police power, then the fact
that the voters of Eastlake wish it so would not save the restriction."' 8 7 He suggested that variances or other administrative relief
could redress any hardship created by an arbitrary decision of the
electorate. 8 5 Although this remark ignores the special hardship
showing required of a variance applicant in jurisdictions like Florida, 8 9 it does implicitly recognize that the zoning process must afford individual property owners an opportunity to present a meri131. Id. at 237-38 (quoting with approval Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or.
574, 580, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973)).
132. 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
133. Id. at 198, 324 N.E.2d at 747.
134. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976).
135. Id. at 679 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (Black, J.)).
136. Id. at 675 n.10.
137. Id. at 676. Justice Stevens objected to relying on a later substantive challenge to
cure a procedural defect: "[I]f there is a constitutional right to fundamental fairness in the
procedure applicable to an ordinary request for an amendment to the zoning applicable to
an individual parcel, that right is not vindicated by the opportunity to make a substantive
due process attack on the ordinance itself." Id. at 694 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 674 n.9, 679 n.13.
139. See notes 55-72 and accompanying text infra.
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torious case for relief. In other words, even assuming the propriety
of deciding questions of community policy by referendum, "the
popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the rights
of individual litigants, ' 14 0 as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent. The majority avoided directly addressing this procedural due
process issue, accepting instead the Ohio court's binding determi14 1
nation that the rezoning was legislative under state law.
Ignoring the Supreme Court's Eastlake opinion, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in City of Tamarac v. Sabal
Palm Golf Club, Inc.,1 " invalidated a provision in the Tamarac
city charter that required a referendum before rezoning recreational lands for any other purpose. The opinion cited no authority
for this result, although it could have relied on the First District's
well-reasoned Andover opinion, which had recognized that rezoning decisions applied to single owners or single tracts are quasijudicial or administrative rather than legislative. By focusing on
this procedural due process issue, rather than on the delegation
doctrine relied upon by the Ohio court, one can readily distinguish
Eastlake. The Tamarac court failed to make this distinction,
thereby missing an opportunity to settle an important issue in
Florida law.
Until the Florida courts adopt either the Andover or the Carmichael position, however, the Florida practitioner would be wise
to question the validity of any zoning change adopted by a referendum that affects only one small tract or owner. Although highly
democratic, the referendum bypasses the compromise and modification available with zoning boards and city councils, thus reducing the determination of the merits of the controversy to a single
choice-approval or disapproval by the electorate. In such situations, the constitutional rights of due process and equal protection
should prevail over an idealistic "devotion to democracy."
VII.

CONFISCATORY ZONING

The Florida courts have wrestled with definitions to distinguish confiscatory zoning from arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable zoning, and to determine the appropriate remedy for confiscatory zoning. "A zoning ordinance is confiscatory if it deprives an
140. 426 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 674 n.9.
142. 382 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (Anstead, J., concurred in the conclusion

only).
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owner of the beneficial use of his property by precluding all uses to
which the property might be put or the only use to which it is
14
reasonably adaptable.""' As illustrated by the Boca Villas case, .
however, the court may find a zoning ordinance unconstitutionally

arbitrary and unreasonable without reaching the issue of its confiscatory application to specific parcels."

Confiscatory zoning challenges often arise when a single tract
remains in a highly restrictive zoning classification, but the character of the neighborhood has changed substantially. For example,
the local government may have upzoned the surrounding property

or granted variances or constructed highways or public facilities
near the property. Because the old classification discriminates
against the owner of the more restricted tract vis-a-vis his neighbors, one might call this neglect "inverse spot zoning." 14 6 In effect,
the property owner argues that his tract is "the last rose of summer. . . left blooming alone '" 7 in a zoning classification that is no

longer fairly debatable.
This argument was successful in City of Hialeah v. Cama
Corp.," 8 in which the District Court of Appeal, Third District, upheld a trial court order directing the city to upzone the plaintiff's
property to a classification no more restrictive than high density

multiple-family residential. The property, which fronted on a
heavily travelled four-lane highway, had remained in a single-farn143. Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1977).
144. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 157-59 (Fla. 4th DCA
1979); see notes 103-11 and accompanying text supra.
145. One explanation for judicial reluctance to reach the confiscation issue is the spectre of money damages in an inverse condemnation action against the zoning authority. See
notes 158-91 and accompanying text infra.
146. "Inverse spot zoning" is the other side of the coin from spot zoning, which Florida
courts have uniformly condemned as a form of discrimination that unreasonably authorizes
a heavier use of a single tract than is otherwise permissible within that zoning district. For
example, in Allapattah Community Ass'n v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d DCA
1980), a meat packing company, located on the commercially zoned south side of a street,
sought to rezone for commercial use its four lots located on the residentially zoned north
side. Because the requested rezoning would produce undesirable spot zoning, the city zoning
board denied the application. Id. at 390. When the city commission subsequently upzoned
the entire north side of the street to accomplish the same purpose, the Third District struck
down the rezoning as arbitrary and unreasonable because it bore no reasonable relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or welfare. The court rejected the city's circumvention of
the spot zoning rule by rezoning the entire neighborhood: "If it is improper to create a spot
in a neighborhood, it is even more plainly unacceptable entirely to obliterate it." Id. at 395
n.9.

147. T. MOORE, The Last Rose of Summer, in
148. 360 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).

IRISH MELODIES

(1st ed. 1802).
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ily residential classification despite substantial changes in the zoning and use of adjoining tracts for high density residential and
commercial purposes. In view of the surrounding uses, the court
concluded that maintenance of the present zoning classification
was "confiscatory" and no longer fairly debatable. " "
In Dade County v.Florida Mining & Materials Corp.,50 another panel of the same district court of appeal was more careful in
its use of the term confiscatory. The county had denied a landowner's request for an unusual use and variance for rock mining in
an environmentally sensitive zone in the East Everglades. The
county's master plan prohibited such a use. The trial court held
that this denial was arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory because the county had permitted essentially similar mining activities on surrounding tracts after adopting its plan. The Third District affirmed this result, but rejected the trial court's additional
conclusion that the zoning was confiscatory and deprived the
plaintiff of any beneficial use.' 5 '
Changed conditions, however, failed to motivate the court to
order a residential tract upzoned for a motel in Alachua County v.
Reddick,1' despite the proximity of the property to a new highway
interchange described as "probably one of the most important...
in the state of Florida." 58 The county had denied the requested
rezoning, determining that the proposed strip commercial development would create traffic hazards and depreciate neighboring residential tracts. The District Court of Appeal, First District, found
that the county's decision was not arbitrary because it related to
the public safety and general welfare. Furthermore, the existing
classification was not confiscatory because the tract retained
149. See also Dugan v. City of Jacksonville, 343 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Olive

v. City of Jacksonville, 328 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d 214
(Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Stokes v. City of Jacksonville, 276 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
Neighboring uses may make the classification of a particular tract objectionable even
when the zoning authority first classifies it. For example, in City of Sanibel v. Goode, 372
So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), a newly incorporated municipality implemented its comprehensive land use plan by classifying as residential a lot that previously applicable county
zoning had classified as commercial. The court found that commercial establishments, which

were now nonconforming uses, virtually surrounded the lot, making its new classification
arbitrary and unreasonable. The effect of ordering the city to reclassify the property for

commercial use, however, was to imprint the hodgepodge of previous uses on the city's plan
for future land use.
150. 364 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
151. Id. at 34.
152. 368 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
153. Id. at 654.
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"value and utility as a single-family residence."' 15 ' Although the
owners' witness testified that the highest and best use of the property would be a motel or restaurant development, the court responded: "A zoning authority. . . is not obliged in all events, and
irrespective of the detrimental consequences to public facilities
and neighboring properties, to rezone private property for its
'highest and best use' or for its highest salability."' 1 55
Following this rationale of the Reddick court, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, upheld a county commission's refusal to rezone a tract for its highest and best use in Broward
County v. Capeletti Brothers.1"6 The holders of a purchase option
sought to use the land as an excavation site, although all surrounding parcels were zoned for agricultural use. The trial court held for
the optionees because the county had deprived them of "a reasonable use and enjoyment" of the property, but the Fourth District
reversed: "A zoning ordinance is not confiscatory because a single
reasonable use is denied; rather it becomes confiscatory when all
reasonable uses are prohibited."1 5 7 Even though the zoning board
and planning commission had recommended the requested rezoning, the court held that the commission's denial was fairly debatable and therefore neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.
The rule that emerges from these cases is that substantial
changes in a neighborhood, standing alone, may be insufficient to
justify rezoning if the present zoning does not deprive the owner of
all reasonable use of the property; the change in the surrounding
area must be so substantial that the need for upzoning is no longer
fairly debatable. Even if the need for some upzoning is no longer
fairly debatable, the court will not require reclassification for the
property's highest, best, or most economically feasible use.15 8
154. Id. at 657.
155. Id. In rejecting commercial rezoning, however, the court expressly left open the
possibility of upzoning for noncommercial uses. Id. at 659.
156. 375 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1980).
157. Id. at 315 (emphasis in original) (citing S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach,
355 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)).
158. The court may only indicate the most restrictive permissible zoning classification;
it may not order the zoning authority to rezone the property to one particular classification.
An order for specific rezoning would violate the separation of powers doctrine because the
choice among various permissible zoning classifications belongs to the legislative body. See,
e.g., City of Clearwater v. Curls, 366 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Town of Longboat Key
v. Kirstein, 352 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
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REGULATORY TAKINGS

What remedies may an aggrieved landowner seek when a confiscatory zoning or land use regulation deprives him of the beneficial use of his property? Arguing that this deprivation violates due
process of law and takes his property for public use without just
compensation, " the landowner typically asks the court to declare
the regulation invalid and enjoin its enforcement.160 Such declaratory and injunctive relief is consistent with the classic Supreme
Court "taking" decision, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,"' in
which Justice Holmes refused to sustain an exercise of the police
power when the challenged statute would have diminished property values impermissibly, absent exercise of the eminent domain
power and payment of compensation. 6s
Holmes' broad language characterizing excessive regulations as
159. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
"No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner . . . ." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
160. Economic considerations lead most landowners to prefer to keep the parcel and
profit from its development, rather than surrender it to the municipality for compensation.
As Professor Costonis has pointed out,
[Tihe goal of [challenges to regulatory measures] in conventional land use disputes is simply to preclude application of the measure to the restricted parcel on
the basis of its constitutional infirmity. What is achieved, in short, is declaratory
relief. The sole exception to this mild outcome occurs where the challenged measure is either intended to eventuate in actual public ownership of the land or has
already caused government to encroach on the land with trespassory consequences that are largely irreversible.
Costonis, "Fair"Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COL. L. REv. 1021, 1035 (1975).
161. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
162. Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have
its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts.
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. As we already have
said, this is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions.
Id. at 413, 416.
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"takings" suggests a view of government power over property
rights as a "continuum" running from noncompensable police
power to compensable eminent domain power.168 Thus, in Supreme
Court parlance, a government action adjudicated a "taking" is one
requiring judicial relief for the aggrieved property owner.16 4 The
continuum approach, however, offers little guidance on the appropriate remedy: should the court declare the government action un-

constitutional and invalid, or should it award the property owner
just compensation for the property taken?

Critics argue that Holmes erred in treating the police power
and eminent domain power as merely different in degree rather
than different in kind.' 5 If different in kind, the two powers have
predictable remedies: compensation is necessary to validate a gov-

ernment appropriation of property for public use under its eminent domain power, but an excessive police power regulation vio-

lating due process is unconstitutional and invalid.""s A mere
difference in degree, however, suggests a third possible alternative:
"compensable regulation" restricting the use of property in the
public interest without governmental acquisition of a fee interest,
but without imposing the cost of the restriction on the property
67
owner alone.1

163. The continuum approach thus describes not a test but judicial results based on the
circumstances of each case. See id. at 413; Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus,8 SANTA CLARA

LAW.

1 (1967).

164. See notes 204-07 and accompanying text infra.
165. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 118-34 (1973). Bosselman and his colleagues argue that in Pennsylvania Coal, Holmes abandoned the Court's
position in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), which upheld under the police power a
statute that banned the manufacture of intoxicating liquors and rendered the plaintiff's
brewery valueless, distinguishing a compensable taking as an appropriation of property.
166. See 1 NICHOLS' EMiNENT

DOMAIN

§ 1.42[1] (3d rev. ed. 1975):

Not only is an actual physical appropriation, under an attempted exercise of
the police power, in practical effect an exercise of the power of eminent domain,
but if regulative legislation is so unreasonable or arbitrary as virtually to deprive
a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his property, it comes within the
purview of the law of eminent domain. Such legislation is an invalid exercise of
the police power since it is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. It is invalid as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain since no provision is made for
compensation.
Although this oft-quoted passage recognizes that complete deprivation under the police
power is equally objectionable as condemnation or physical appropriation without compensation, it identifies neither the power exercised nor the remedy required in a particular case.
167. This alternative preserves beneficial regulations while avoiding the unsatisfactory
choice between full compensation and no compensation. For a comprehensive account of the
scholarly debate in the 1960's and 1970's over the desirability and mechanics of compensable regulation, see Hagman, Compensable Regulation: A Way of Dealing with Wipeouts
from Land Use Controls? 54 U. DEr. J. Urs. L. 45, 47-64 (1976).
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Compensable Regulation

With the growth of environmental awareness in the 1970's and
the corresponding increase in land use regulation, landowners have
experienced more difficulty exempting their property from its impact.1 ' 8 If such regulation is unavoidable, one landowner alternative is to shift the cost back to the regulating entities-primarily
local governments with scarce resources. Some commentators urge
that a careful legislative balancing of public and private interests is
necessary to allocate the cost of land use regulation properly. 69
But until the legislature strikes such a balance, the courts must
resolve land use disputes as they arise. The most popular landowner vehicle for shifting the cost of land use regulation back to
local governments is the inverse condemnation action,17 0 although
other theories for seeking compensation in the courts are
71
possible.1
Inverse condemnation is "a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been
taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted
by the taking agency.' ' 7 2 Ordinarily, the "taking in fact" involves a
physical intrusion or appropriation of the plaintiff's property.178
168. Id. at 48, 53.
169. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANrA, supra note 165, at 302, 327; Costonis, supra note 161, at 1048-49; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments
on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967);
Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation
Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1971).
170. See, e.g., Badler, Municipal Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5
URw. LAW. 25 (1973); Comment, "Takings" under the Police Power-The Development of
Inverse Condemnation as a Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 30 Sw. L.J. 723
(1976).
171. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101S. Ct. 1287, 1306
n.23 (1981); Schnidman, Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency: Opening the Door to a Section 1983 Cause of Action in Land Use Litigation, 54 FLA. B.J. 547
(1980).

172. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1975),
quoted in United States v. Clarke, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1130 (1980).
173. It is essential, of course, to show that the governmental action took a private property interest belonging to the plaintiff. In Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So.
2d 663 (Fla. 1979), the Supreme Court of Florida rejected an inverse condemnation claim by
a condominium developer alleging that a nearby municipality had pumped excessive quantities of water from a shallow aquifer underlying the developer's land. The excessive pumping
had caused salt water from the intercoastal waterway to intrude into the aquifer, forcing the
developer to drill wells into a deeper aquifer at greater expense. Reversing the lower court,
the supreme court held that the right to use water from the shallow aquifer was not "property" comparable to an airspace easement, since the alleged taking "deprived [the devel-
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For example, Florida courts have recognized a cause of action for
damages in inverse condemnation when landowners alleged that
17
public utility buildings encroached beyond a public easement, '
that street improvements caused permanent flooding of their property,7 5 that closing a street substantially deprived them of access
to their property, 7 6e or that excessive noise from low-flying planes
deprived them of all beneficial use of their property.'7 The court
is even more likely to find a governmental appropriation when the
landowner can show that the government restricted the use of his
property in order to "reserve" it9 for future acquisition,17 8 or to
7
avoid condemning it altogether.
oper] of no beneficial use of the land itself." Id. at 670. Rather, the right to use water was
governed by the Florida Water Resources Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 373.012-.6 (1979), which the
court found "no more objectionable than legislation forbidding the use of property for certain purposes by zoning regulations." 371 So. 2d at 670 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
174. Alizieri v. Manatee County, 396 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
175. Thompson v. Nassau County, 343 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (landowners
alleged that resurfacing by county had raised street elevation and diverted rainwater overflow to their property, constituting actual permanent invasion). See United States v. Cress,
243 U.S. 316 (1917) (upholding an award of compensation for repeated floodings of land
caused by a government water project).
176. Pinellas County v. Austin, 323 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (county vacated dirt
road leading to landowners' tract; only other access was over a small wooden bridge inadequate to support heavy vehicles such as firetrucks). Inverse condemnation was also the remedy for a denial of access in Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959), when
owners of resort property located in a roadless-area of a national forest challenged an executive order prohibiting air travel over the forest below 4000 feet.
177. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth. v. Benitez, 200 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
(overflights by commercial jet aircraft only 250 to 500 feet above property constituted taking
of avigational easement). See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1961).
178. For example, in Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d
671 (1979), the court held that by approving a developer's plat only after reserving an undeveloped corridor for proposed highway construction at an indefinite future date, the city had
taken the property and must respond in inverse condemnation damages. Recognizing the
harshness of forcing an unanticipated expenditure, the court remanded to the trial court
with instructions to suspend entry of the judgment for six months and to dismiss the action
if either the city approved the plat without the corridor restriction or the highway department condemned the property. Id. at -,594 P.2d at 683. See also notes 185-90 and accompanying text infra.
Similarly, in Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1969), a landowner received inverse condemnation damages when a county restricted development in anticipation of acquiring his tract for an airport but renounced the airport plans
five years later.
In Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968), the court
awarded the value of a purchase option as compensation for a "temporary taking" imposed
by a municipal ordinance reserving plaintiff's land for a park pending a decision to condemn
it.
179. In Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963), a
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From the municipal and environmental point of view, there
are sound policy reasons for limiting a landowner's remedies to invalidation of the unconstitutional zoning ordinance. Opponents of
inverse condemnation argue that landowners should not have the
option "to convert an exercise of regulatory power that has been
deemed unlawful into a lawful compensable taking," 180 leading to
judicial allocation of local governments' limited financial resources
through possibly staggering damage awards. Furthermore, this
threat of potential compensation liability would chill innovative
land use planning.181
Commentators favoring compensable regulation, on the other
hand, respond that awarding compensation will encourage more rational decisionmaking by regulatory agencies forced to weigh the
benefits of the zoning plan against its true costs, which are arguably more staggering for the landowner who must otherwise bear
them alone. 182 A further advantage of compensation is preservation
of the comprehensive zoning plan, which judicial invalidation
would otherwise debilitate. 83 Moreover, most scholars favoring
landowner stated a cause of action in inverse condemnation when a county enacted a zoning
restriction forbidding structures or vegetation over three inches high, rather than acquire an
air easement to operate flights over the property. As in other overflight cases, Sneed involved physical intrusion. See note 177 supra.
180. Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a
Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439, 1443 (1974).
The landowner who "opts" for compensation in inverse condemnation essentially concedes that but for the absence of compensation, the confiscatory zoning ordinance is constitutional. In Kasser v. Dade County, 344 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), the court recoiled at
an inverse condemnation plaintiff's inconsistency in challenging the ordinance as a taking
while accepting its police power validity:
We cannot allow the appellant to assert that the denial of rezoning was reasonable while simultaneously alleging that it was confiscatory. If we were to accept such contradictory claims as grounds for the relief which appellant Sought
in the trial court [inverse condemnation damages], we would debilitate the zoning review procedure established by Dade County and long accepted by this
Court.
Id. at 929. The court pointed out that if a proper challenge to the constitutional validity of
the underlying zoning ordinance had shown that the denial of the landowner's rezoning request was unreasonable and confiscatory, "the County would then have had the option of
rezoning the property or condemning it via its eminent domain authority." Id. See notes
249-53 and accompanying text infra.
181. Note, supra note 180, at 1450-51; see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra
note 165, at 266-83 (advocating legislative solution rather than judicial determinations of
regulatory taking); Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integrationof Police Power and
Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, in LAND UsE
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS

538-50 (3d ed. 1964), reprinted in 1968 URB. L.

ANN.

1.

182. See, e.g., Badler, supra note 170; Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure
of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238, 1253-54 (1960).
183. Dunham, supra note 182, at 1247; Hagman, supra note 167, at 103.
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compensable regulation propose that the legislature, rather than
the courts, take the lead in formulating compensatory remedies,
which would include less expensive alternatives than outright
18 4
purchase of the fee.
For example, the Model Land Development Code proposed by
the American Law Institute 8 8 provides for compensable regulation
while eliminating the danger that overzealous land use planners
might unwittingly purchase tracts they intended only to regulate.
If the court agrees with the landowner that the challenged
regulation
constitutes a taking of his property without just compensation,
the court shall retain jurisdiction if it further determines that
the limitation on development could be lawfully imposed if compensation were paid, and request the local government to determine whether it wishes to institute proceedings under Article 5
to pay compensation.'"
Article 5 of the Model Code provides for acquisition of an interest
in the property for the difference between the property's value
under the challenged regulation and its value with "the minimum
development necessary to eliminate the unconstitutional taking.' 8 7 If the local government fails to respond within ninety days,
the court declares the regulation invalid. 8 8 Under this procedure,
which reflects the concern of the draftsmen of the Code over judicially awarded compensation, 89 the local government would never
involuntarily exercise its eminent domain power. Legislation more
sympathetic to landowner interests would preserve local government choice between invalidation and validation with compensation, yet retain the power of the court to order compensation if
184. Hagman, supra note 167, at 48-64, 119-21; see note 169 supra. At first blush, it
may seem contradictory that the same commentators who favor compensable regulation in
some form also object to inverse condemnation awards from the courts. This objection only
reflects dissatisfaction with the typical all or nothing results under the judicial taking analysis: it fails to distribute the increased costs of modern land use regulation equitably between
the landowner and the public. As preferable as legislative balancing may be, however, a
landowner presently burdened by a confiscatory regulation cannot wait for the legislature to
fashion a statutory remedy, so he brings an inverse condemnation action for the court to
decide.
185. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (1975).
186. Id. § 9-112(3).
187. Id. § 5-303(5). See Hagman, supra note 167, at 68-69, 107-08.
188. ALI MODEL LAND DEELOPmNT CODE § 9-112(3) (1975).
189. Professor Bosselman, who opposed judicially awarded compensation, is the Associate Reporter for the Model Code. See F. BoSsELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note
165.
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necessary.190

Absent a statutory solution, the courts have continued to
struggle with the inverse condemnation issue in land use controversies, with four cases reaching the Supreme Court of the United
States since 1978.191 The following sections will discuss those cases
in the context of the approaches taken by the New York, California, and Florida courts to this problem.
B. New York Cases
In Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 192 New
York responded to the question of remedies for confiscatory land
use regulation by narrowing the definition of taking. Rather than
award damages in inverse condemnation, the New York Court of
Appeals invalidated a challenged ordinance that rezoned a private
parcel as a public park and thereby deprived the owners of all reasonable income or other private use of their property. The court
followed Professor Sax's distinction193 between a compensable appropriation of private resources by the government acting in its
"enterprise" capacity, and an unconstitutional regulation that
"amounts to a deprivation or frustration of property rights without
due process of law,

194

which it promulgates in its "arbitral"

capacity.
In the present case, while there was a significant diminution
in the value of the property, there was no actual appropriation
or taking of the parks by title or governmental occupation....
There was no physical invasion of the owner's property; nor was
there an assumption by the city of the control or management of
190. See notes 279-87 and accompanying text infra.

191. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S; Ct. 1287 (1981); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
192. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, cert. denied & appeal dismissed,
429 U.S. 990 (1976).
193. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALz L.J. 36 (1964):
This analysis rests upon the distinction between the role of government as participant and the government as mediator in the process of competition among
economic claims. The losses to individual property owners arising from government activity of the first type result in a benefit to a government enterprise;
losses arising from the second type of activity are the result of government mediating conflicts between competing private economic claims and produces no benefit to any government enterprise.
Id. at 62.
194. 39 N.Y.2d at 594, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
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the parks ....
Absent factors of governmental displacement of
private ownership, occupation or management, there was no

"taking" within the meaning of constitutional limitations ...
There was, therefore, no right to compensation as for a taking in
5
eminent domain.19
Because the zoning ordinance destroyed the economic value of the
property, the court invalidated it on due process grounds, even

though the ordinance provided for the severance and transferability of development rights (TDRs) to other parcels. 196 Although
professing sensitivity to innovative land use controls, the court
found these "floating" development rights ineffective in preventing
the destruction of economic value because they were contingent
upon further administrative approval and were not readily attach-

197
able to a receiving parcel under common ownership.
In contrast, the New York court in Penn Central Transporta-

tion Co. v. New York City,1e8 found no denial of due process when

a landmark preservation statute prevented construction of an office
tower over Grand Central Station but provided for TDRs. Penn
Central asked the court to declare the statute unconstitutional and
sought damages, claiming there was a "temporary taking" as long
as the statute applied to the property. The court applied a due
process analysis to reject the temporary taking claim, 1e thus maintaining its distinction between compensable eminent domain tak-

ings and unconstitutionally oppressive regulations. The challenged
landmark regulation permitted continued productive use of the
property as a railway terminal,0 0 unlike the park zoning that pro195. Id. at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10.
Adopting the French rationale, the Supreme Court of Oregon in Fifth Ave. Corp. v.
Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 581 P.2d 50 (1978), rejected a landowner's inverse condemnation claim for planning or zoning that designated land for a public use unless: "(1) he
is precluded from all economically feasible private uses pending eventual taking for public
use; or (2) the designation results in such governmental intrusion as to inflict virtually irreversible damage." Id. at 614, 581 P.2d at 63.
196. "Development rights transfer breaks the linkage between particular land and its
development potential by permitting the transfer of that potential, or 'development rights,'
to land where greater density will not be objectionable." Costonis, Development Rights
Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 85-86 (1973); see Costonis, supra note 46.
But see Note, The Unconstitutionalityof TransferableDevelopment Rights, 84 YALE L.J.
1101 (1975).
197. 39 N.Y.2d at 597-600, 350 N.E.2d at 387-89, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11-13.
198. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), afl'd, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
199. Id. at 329, 366 N.E.2d at 1274, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 917; cf. Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of
Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968) (compensation for temporary taking).
200. The court also imputed to the terminal earnings from Penn Central's adjacent
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hibited any productive use of the French parcel. 20 1 And unlike the

TDRs left in "legal limbo" in French, the TDRs for the terminal
tract were transferable to numerous adjacent tracts also owned by
Penn Central.2 e0 The court found no due process violation, because
both the regulation permitting some productive use and the TDR
substitution were reasonable; it is unclear, however, whether either
feature alone would have sufficed to sustain the statute.0
Although the United States Supreme Court relied upon the
same factors in affirming the Penn Central decision, it used a more
traditional approach to takings instead of the New York due process analysis.20 4 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court expressly de-

clined to "embrace the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur
unless government has transferred physical control over a portion

of a parcel.'

0

5

That "proposition," of course, is the narrow defini-

tion of taking adopted by the New York court in French: an exer-

cise of the eminent domain power entitling an aggrieved owner to
properties.
201. 42 N.Y.2d at 336, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
202. Id.
203. If continued productive use of the rail terminal was insufficient alone to sustain
the statute, then by treating the TDRs as "reasonable" compensation necessary to provide
due process, the court in effect recognized the constitutionality of a compensable regulation
technique.
Development rights, once transferred, may not be equivalent in value to development rights on the original site. But that, alone, does not mean that the
substitution of rights amounts to a deprivation of property without due process
of law. Land use regulation often diminishes the value of the property to the
landowner. Constitutional standards, however, are offended only when that diminution leaves the owner with no reasonable use of the property. The situation
with transferable development rights is analogous. If the substitute rights received provide reasonable compensation for a landowner forced to relinquish development rights on a landmark site, there has been no deprivation of due process. The compensation need not be the "just" compensation required in
eminent domain, for there has been no attempt to take property ....
Id. at 335, 366 N.E.2d at 1278, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (citing French and Costonis, supra note
160, at 1061-70).
204. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Rather than discuss whether government must ever pay compensation for police power regulation, the Court treated the TDRs as pre-existing rights
rather than compensation: "[I]t
is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied
all use of even those pre-existing air rights. Their ability to use these rights has not been
abrogated; they are made transferable ....
" Id. at 137. Under this rationale, the Court
could consider the TDRs in the taking analysis without acknowledging it was a net-aftercompensation calculus: "While these rights may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a 'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever
financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken
into account in considering the impact of regulation." Id.; see note 203 supra.
205. 438 U.S. at 123 n.25.

ZONING LAW

1981]

recover compensation in an inverse condemnation suit.2Y The two
definitions of taking differ because the two courts use them for
different purposes. For the New York court, the taking issue addresses only whether just compensation is due for an eminent domain condemnation; a separate due process analysis tests the regulation against the police power. For the Supreme Court, the taking
issue determines only whether the challenged government action is
close enough to the eminent domain end of the continuum to warrant judicial relief.20 7 The New York court thus engages in two
analyses, each with an assigned remedy, but the Supreme Court
engages in only one-delineating the limit of incompensable police
power without predicting the remedy.
C.

California Cases

A series of California decisions almost culminated in presenting to the Supreme Court of the United States the question
whether the fifth and fourteenth amendments require a state court
to afford a remedy in inverse condemnation damages for an unconstitutional regulatory taking of property when the remedies of declaratory relief and mandamus are available.20 8 Accepting the rationale offered by opponents of inverse condemnation in zoning
controversies, the Supreme Court of California has taken the position that invalidation of the challenged regulation is the lands These cases are essentially repetitions
owner's exclusive remedy.2"
of the French and Penn Central controversies in New York, without the TDR compensation element.
In HFH,Inc. v. Superior Court, 10 the Supreme Court of California held that landowners had failed to state a cause of action in
inverse condemnation by alleging that an ordinance downzoning
their property to single-family residential use had so diminished
its market value as to take it without just compensation. Holding
insufficient the landowners' allegations of mere diminution in
value, the court effectively invited subsequent inverse condemnation suits by declaring: "This case does not present, and we therefore do not decide, the question of entitlement to compensation in
the event a zoning regulation forbade substantially all use of the
206.
207.
208.
209.
372, 377
210.

39 N.Y.2d at 595, 350 N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S:2d at 9-10.
See notes 163-65 and accompanying text supra.
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr.
(1979) (quoting Note, supra note 180, at 1450-51), a/f'd, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
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land in question. We leave the question for another day." ''
In Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 21 2 the California Court of Ap-

peal, First District, held that two landowners alleging that zoning
ordinances had denied them any substantial or reasonable use of

their property had stated a cause of action in inverse condemnation. 1 One landowner conceded the validity of the ordinances, 1
which zoned his tract for "permanent open space" uses, including
public parks, hiking trails, recreation purposes, and wildlife habi-

tats.2 ' 5 The court rejected the other landowner's alternative prayer
for a declaration that the ordinances were unconstitutional and invalid because arbitrary and unreasonable; instead, the court upheld them as valid exercises of the police power for which the landowner's only remedy was compensation in inverse condemnation.2 1 6
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 7 the Supreme Court of California expressly disapproved of the Eldridge result and declared that
inverse condemnation would not lie to remedy a zoning ordinance
even if it forbade substantially all use of a tract, thus ostensibly
reaching the issue left open in HFH:
[A] landowner alleging that a zoning ordinance has deprived
him of substantially all use of his land may attempt through declaratory relief or mandamus to invalidate the ordinance as excessive regulation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 19, of the California Constitution. He may not, however, elect to sue in inverse
condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid ....
To the extent that Eldridge v.
211. Id. at 518, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.16.
212. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
213. The court of appeals had originally decided Eldridge, 51 Cal. App. 3d 726, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (1975), before the supreme court decided HFH.The supreme court agreed to hear
Eldridge, vacated it, and retransferred it to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light
of HFH. See Eldridge, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 635-36, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89 (Sims, J., dissenting). The court of appeals majority then reaffirmed its original position, relying on the issue
left open in HFH. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 624, 129 Cal. Rptr. 581.
214. Objecting to the landowner's option not to seek declaratory relief, the dissenting
justice insisted that by conceding the validity of the ordinance, the landowner had "stipulated himself out of court." 57 Cal. App. 3d at 638, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (Sims, J., dissenting). See note 180 supra.

215. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 638, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
216. Id. at 631, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 586. For a spirited attack on the Eldridge decision
from the environmentalist point of view as well as a discussion of the California inverse
condemnation cases, see Bozung, Judicially Created Zoning with Compensation: California's Brief Experiment with Inverse Condemnation, 10 ENVT'L L. 67 (1979).
217. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
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City of Palo Alto (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 613, 129 Cal.Rptr. 575, is
contrary, it is expressly disapproved." 8

In Agins, landowners sought both declaratory relief and $2 million
in damages when the city abandoned a condemnation proceeding
to acquire their land and enacted a zoning ordinance designating it
"Residential Planned Development and Open Space Zone," which
would permit up to five single-family dwellings."1 Declaring that
"a zoning ordinance may be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only when its effect is to deprive the owner of substantially
all reasonable use of his property,"' 0 the court held that because
the owners could still build up to five houses, the invalidation remedy was not available.221 The dissent pointed out, however, that

this "mere diminution" holding made dictum of the majority's inverse condemnation ban, because if the ordinance did not forbid
substantially all use of the property, Agins was controlled by HFH
and did not squarely present the issue left open in that decision.22
When the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to review the Agins case," 8 many commentators expected the Court to
resolve the controversy over zoning and inverse condemnation.224
The Court dashed those expectations, however, by merely affirming on the basis that there was no taking because the zoning
ordinance permitted limited residential construction.2" Implicitly
218. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
219. Id. at 271, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374. Although procedurally the issue
was whether the landowners' allegations of no remaining reasonable beneficial use were sufficient against demurrer, the court looked behind the complaint and took cognizance of possible uses under the ordinance. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378; see id. at
280, 598 P.2d at 33, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 380 n.2 (Clark, J., dissenting). The Agins case, like
HFH and Eldridge before it, asked only whether landowners had stated a cause of action in
inverse condemnation; San Diego, in contrast, went to trial.
220. 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
221. The court also rejected the landowners' argument that the city's abandoned eminent domain proceeding amounted to "precondemnation activities" demonstrating that the
city intended the zoning ordinance to accomplish the same purpose. Id. at 277-78, 598 P.2d
at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The court distinguished Kopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d
39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972), as involving only damages from unreasonable
conduct and delay before condemnation, a circumstance absent in Agins.
222. 24 Cal. 3d at 282, 598 P.2d at 34, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 381 n.3 (Clark, J., dissenting).
223. Agins v. City of Tiburon, prob. juris. noted, 444 U.S. 1011 (Jan. 7, 1980).
224. See, e.g., Payne, California Downzoning Controversy to Reach the U.S. Supreme
Court, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 48 (1980); Key Land Case Confronts Court: Issue Is Whether Town
Must Pay Compensation for Zoning Change, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 3; Time
Ripe for Review of Tiburon, Professor Says, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 18, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
225. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2142 (1980). This result led some commentators to wonder why the Court had bothered to hear the case at all. See, e.g., Smith,
An Inverse Condemnation Puzzle: The Agins Case Lands in Limbo, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4,
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agreeing with the dissenting justice below that Agins did not present the inverse condemnation issue, the Court said: "Because no
taking has occurred, we need not consider whether a State may
limit the remedies available to a person whose land has been taken
without just compensation. ' M As in the Penn Central decision,
the challenged police power regulation never crossed the Court's7
line for a taking, excusing the Court from prescribing a remedy. 2
In the meantime, another case that apparently presented the
remedy issue squarely was progressing through the California8
courts. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,"2
the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, upheld a verdict
for a utility company of over $3 million in inverse condemnation
damages for property designated "open space" by the city's general
plan and zoning ordinances. San Diego presented the unique circumstance of a tract suited only for industrial purposes; but because such use was incompatible with open space, the designation
effectively denied any economic use of the property.'" Although
the utility company also sought a declaration that the regulation
was unconstitutional and void, the court quickly dismissed the opportunity to find a due process violation, finding no evidence of
improper notice or arbitrariness. 8 0 The San Diego case thus apparently presented the issue left open in HFH and Agins: Would
inverse condemnation lie when an otherwise valid zoning restriction forbade substantially all use of the property?
When the Supreme Court of California later barred the inverse condemnation remedy in Agins, it remanded San Diego to
the appellate court for reconsideration. Reversing its prior deci1980,- at 52, col. 3.
226. 100 S. Ct. at 2143.
227. See 438 U.S. at 122. The landmark preservation law in Penn Central arguably

crossed the "taking" line, however, if one assumes that TDR compensation saved it from
invalidity. See note 204 supra.
228. 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (Ct. App. 1978) (opinion withdrawn from publication; appears
only in unofficial reporter).
229. The utility company presented expert witnesses who testified that the property, a
coastal tract,
could not be used for agriculture because of the soil's high salt content; it could

not be used for residences because the land is in a flood plan [sic]; it could not
be used economically for grazing; it could not be used for a golf course because
of poor drainage. In short, the only possible use of the land was for industrial.
Id. at 113.

230. d. at 114. By challenging the validity of the zoning, the utility company avoided
the inconsistency problem pointed out in the Eldridge dissent. See note 214 supra. On the
other hand, the company's consistency did not redeem the appellate court's inadequate
analysis of the due process issue.
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sion, the appellate court held that, although the utility company
could seek only declaratory relief, its availability depended upon
"disputed fact issues not covered by the trial court" concerning the
alleged arbitrariness of the city's exercise of police power.' These
issues, said the court, "can be dealt with anew should [appellant]
elect to retry the case.'2'82 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, this remark indicated to the majority of the Justices
that the California court had "not decided whether any other remedy is available because it has not decided whether any taking in
fact has occurred."'' 8 Because there was no final judgment or decree below, the Court found itself without jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Nevertheless, the opinions filed in San Diego indicate that at
least five Justices 8 4 were prepared to reject the California position
and hold "that government action other than acquisition of title,
occupancy, or physical invasion can be a 'taking,' and therefore a
de facto exercise of the power of eminent domain, where the effects
completely deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the
property."'8 8 Dissenting from the Court's dismissal of the appeal,
Justice Brennan reached the merits of the taking question and rejected the notion of the New York and California courts 28' that
because zoning is based on the police power, a zoning regulation
remains an uncompensable exercise of the police power, no matter
how confiscatory:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and
other land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of
property in order to promote the public good just as effectively
as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property ...
231. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, No. 16277 (Cal. Ct. App., unpublished opinion filed June 26, 1979), quoted in 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1293 (1981).
232. Id.
233. 101 S. Ct. at 1294 (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., White, Rehnquist, & Stevens, JJ.).
234. See id. at 1296 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, & Powell, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1294 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("If I were satisfied that this appeal was from a
'final judgment or decree'. . . I would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is
said in the dissenting opinion of JusTric BRENNAN."); id. at 1294 (Blackmun, J.) ("[T]he
federal constitutional aspects of that issue [denial of a monetary remedy] are not to be cast
aside lightly . . ").
235. Id. at 1304 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Penn Central,438 U.S. at 123 n.25 (Justice Brennan similarly rejected the New York court's limited definition of "taking.").
236. 101 S.Ct. at 1302 n.14 (criticizing Fred French as "tampering" with Pennsylvania
Coal opinion); id. at 1303 n.17 (finding California reading of Pennsylvania Coal
"unpersuasive").
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[The city] implicitly posits the distinction that the government
intends to take property through condemnation or physical in-

vasion whereas it does not through police power regulations ....

But "the Constitution measures a taking of property

not by what a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it
does."".7

Justice Brennan cautioned, however, that if the regulatory
taking is temporary and reversible, then the just compensation
clause does not require the government to condemn the property
and pay the owner its full market value. Rather, the court should
order the government to pay "just compensation for the period
commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,'
and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind
or otherwise amend the regulation.'' 2 This "temporary taking" solution recognizes that mere "[i]nvalidation unaccompanied by payment of damages would hardly compensate the landowner for any
economic loss suffered during the time his property was taken.'
Yet, once the court determines that relief is necessary, the government could decide whether to pay compensation and continue the
regulation, or to revoke or amend it. Under Justice Brennan's proposal, the government would retain the option between various
prospective remedies, eliminating the need for the courts to make
a choice between them.
D.

Florida Cases

The Florida courts have produced mixed but reconcilable results in inverse condemnation actions by landowners seeking compensation for property taken by land use regulations. One appellate court, consistent with the California view, has limited the
remedy for confiscatory regulation to invalidation. 4 0 The Supreme
Court of Florida, however, has recently declined to endorse that
position.24 ' The Florida court thus appears to be closer than the
New York or California courts to the views of the Supreme Court
of the United States evidenced in the San Diego opinions.
237. Id. at 1304 (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original)).
238. Id. (footnote omitted).
239. Id. at 1305.
240. Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973),
cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 717 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
241. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 1981 FLA. L. WEEKLY 275 (Fla. Apr. 16, 1981);
see notes 260-65 and accompanying text infra.
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The Supreme Court of Florida has held that a landowner may
not opt for compensation without also challenging the validity of
the land use regulation on due process grounds. In City of Miami
v. Romer,"' the court denied compensation to a landowner who
alleged that a city street setback ordinance had condemned a tenfoot strip of property, but who failed to challenge the ordinance as
unrelated to the public health, safety, and general welfare. After
the landowner's lessee constructed a building on the setback line
and added an adjacent sidewalk occupying half the strip,2 " the
city paved the remaining five feet next to the original street. By
awarding the landowner damages for the entire ten-foot strip, both
pavement and sidewalk, the trial court in effect compensated the
landowner for the mere enactment of a zoning ordinance. The supreme court reversed and remanded-ecause his pleadings had
conceded its validity. The supreme court hinted broadly, however,
that compensation would be proper if the trial court were to find
that the city had taken the five-foot strip that it had paved." 4
On a subsequent appeal,"15 the supreme court found that the
landowner's amended complaint sufficiently alleged that the ordinance was an improper exercise of the police power. The court
opined that if the trial court now found the ordinance valid, the
only question would be whether the city had taken the strip by
paving it; but if the court found the ordinance invalid, the question
would be whether the deprivation of beneficial use was sufficient to
require compensation to the landowner.24' Although commentators
cite this second Romer opinion as recognizing a right to compensation for an unconstitutional zoning ordinance,4 7 one should note
that mere invalidation was insufficient to restore the beneficial use
of the property after the landowner had constructed his building
on the setback line. Romer is thus more properly regarded as a
case of governmental encroachment with largely irreversible conse8
quences justifying compensation."
Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held in
242. 58 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1952).
243. Id. at 850. The 99-year lease required the lessee to construct the building, with an
increased rental if the lessee obtained city permission to build closer to the street than the
setback line.
244. Id. at 852. Because the lessee had constructed the sidewalk for his own use, the
court held that the city had not appropriated that portion. Id. at 850-51.
245. 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
246. Id. at 287.
247. See Comment, supra note 170, at 740; Note, supra note 180, at 1445 n.25.
248. See Costonis, supra note 160, at 1035.
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Kasser v. Dade County2 " that a landowner could not seek damages in inverse condemnation for denial of his rezoning application
while conceding the validity of the underlying ordinance. The
court noted that the landowner could have either sought certiorari
review of the denial resolution or challenged the constitutionality
of the ordinance directly. But he could not maintain a compensation action by asserting "that the denial of rezoning was reasonable
while simultaneously alleging that it was confiscatory. 2 50 If either
of the suggested due process challenges had invalidated the regulation, "the County would then have had the option of rezoning the
2 61
property or condemning it via its eminent domain authority.
Kasser thus illustrates a principal objection to inverse condemnation actions: because the option to condemn property should remain 'with the governmental entity, the landowner may not
"choose" the compensation remedy by taking inconsistent posi52
tions on the validity of the ordinance.
The "temporary taking" solution proposed by Justice Brennan
in San Diego, however, meets this objection to inverse condemnation by preserving the government's prospective options. The "inconsistency" argument is a false issue when raised by those who
seek to predict the remedy by postulating that eminent domain
and the police power are distinct theories rather than a Pennsylvania Coal continuum.'5 8 Their insistence on linking a separate
remedy to each of two distinct powers conveniently impales the
landowner on a two-horned dilemma. If the landowner challenges
the ordinance as an improper exercise of both powers, then he is
inconsistently seeking compensation for a concededly invalid ordinance. But if he seeks only compensation in eminent domain, then
he has inconsistently conceded the police power validity of the ordinance. Under the two-power model, the landowner's only consistent position is to seek invalidation on police power grounds and
forget about compensation. The "inconsistency" lies not in the
landowner's pleadings, but in the two-power model, created by reasoning backwards from the government's desire to control the
available remedies. In contrast, Justice Brennan's proposal, based
on the continuum model, would compensate the landowner for the
temporary taking that has already occurred, yet would preserve the
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

344 So. 2d. 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
Id. at 929.
Id.
See note 180 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 163-67 and accompanying text supra.
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government's choices between various prospective remedies.
Justice Brennan's proposal, however, may not be feasible when
rescinding or amending the restriction will no longer restore the

beneficial use of the landowner's property.2 5 4 In Askew v. GablesBy-The-Sea, Inc.,25 the state sold a tract of bay bottom to a developer but then revoked permission to dredge and fill. Because
another necessary permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ex-

pired during the litigation that followed, the court ordered the
state to allow the dredging for a specified period, to begin upon the
developer's successful application for an extension of the Corps

permit. When other state agencies joined in a successful effort to
dissuade the Corps from approving the project, the court ordered
the state to condemn the tract, finding that it had permanently
destroyed the value of the bay bottom as private property.'"
Unless the injury is one that declaratory relief cannot cure, as
in Romer or Gables-By-The-Sea, Florida courts remain reluctant

to award compensation for a confiscatory land use regulation, at
least in zoning cases. 57 By upholding the dismissal of an inverse
condemnation count in Mailman Development Corp. v. City of
Hollywood,'" the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
adopted the same position as the California and New York courts:
zoning is not an exercise of the eminent domain power requiring
just compensation. In Mailman, a developer challenged an ordi254. See 101 S. Ct. at 1306-07.
255. 333 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
256. Id. at 61. Rarely does a permit denial cause permanent damage, since the court
could restore the economic potential of the tract by ordering the agency to allow its development. But the Gables-By-The-Sea development required permission from two regulating
entities, only one of which was "estopped" as the seller of the tract. The state's inequitable
delay cost the developer a valuable right-federal permisson to dredge-which the Corps
was not obliged to renew.
In contrast, the Second District found no inverse condemnation in Smith v. City of
Clearwater, 383 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), when local officials deliberately frustrated
construction of high rise units on wetlands in Tampa Bay through the interaction of local
mangrove setback lines, state development of regional impact (DRI) restrictions, and federal
flood plain regulations. Thus, the city's challenged downzoning denied no beneficial use of
the property because, as already regulated, it had virtually no beneficial uses. Id. at 684-85.
257. See, e.g., City of Sanibel v. Goode, 372 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (arbitrary
and unreasonable downzoning to residential of vacant parcel surrounded by commercial establishments held deprivation of only beneficial use; rezoning ordered); City of Hialeah v.
Cama Corp., 360 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ("confiscatory" refusal to upzone when
substantial neighborhood changes made residential classification no longer fairly debatable;
rezoning ordered). See also Dade County v. Florida Mining & Materials Corp., 364 So. 2d 31
(Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (reversing trial court's "confiscation" finding, but striking down variance denial as "discriminatory"; remedy issue thus not presented).
258. 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
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nance downzoning the developer's tract to less than half its former
density and sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and
compensation in inverse condemnation. Rejecting the compensation claim, the court drew a "clear distinction" between the appropriation of private property and the regulation of its use:
We hold that enactment of a zoning ordinance under the exercise of police power does not entitle the property owner to seek
compensation for the taking of the property through inverse
condemnation ....
If the zoning ordinance as applied to the
property involved is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory or
confiscatory (as appellant has alleged in other counts still pending before the trial court), the relief available to the property
owner is a judicial determination that the ordinance is either invalid, or unenforceable as pertains to plaintiffis property."5 9
In the brief opinion generated by the interlocutory appeal, Mailman looks identical to Agins and HFH: beneficial uses apparently
remained after the downzoning. As in those cases, a Florida court
is unlikely to find a taking without a deprivation of substantially
all beneficial use; unless it finds a taking, it need not reach the
remedies issue.
A recent illustration of this standard for a taking is the decision by the Supreme Court of Florida in Graham v.. Estuary
Properties, Inc.260 In that case, a county rejected a developer's
plan to construct an "interceptor waterway" to replace the ecological functions of black mangroves that the developer planned to destroy in building a coastal development of 26,500 units. The county
indicated, however, that the developer could apply for a lower density development of about 13,000 units that would not destroy the
mangroves. On appeal by the developer, the District Court of Appeal, First District, found that the county's determination to preserve the mangroves rendered the property virtually worthless and
ordered the county either to approve the development or to begin
condemnation proceedings within thirty days.2 6 '
The supreme court reversed, rejecting the developer's argu259. Id. at 615; cf. Rhodes, Compensating Police Power Takings: Chapter 78-85, Laws
of Florida, 52 FLA. B.J. 741 (1978) (criticizing Mailman's "clear distinction" in light of compensable regulation).

260. 1981 FLA. L. WEEKLY 275 (Fla. Apr. 16, 1981).
261. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1139-41 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
Although the First District's order gave the county a choice between alternative remedies, it
did not give the county an opportunity to modify the restrictions. See note 286 and accompanying text infra.
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ment that it could make no beneficial use of the property.
"[M]erely because Estuary may be allowed to build a development
only half the size of its original proposal" 62 did not establish a
taking. Similarly, the county had not taken the property by disallowing the interceptor waterway, which would have increased the
value of the property but adversely affected the surrounding wetlands.2 68 The court was careful, however, to limit its holding to the
particular facts of that case:
We do not hold that any time the state requires a proposed
development to be reduced by half it may do so without compensation to the owner. We do hold that, under the facts as
found by the commission,4 the instant reduction is a valid exercise of the police power.26

This qualification necessarily limits the scope of the Mailman
statement that invalidation is the only available remedy for a regulatory taking. Although the supreme court's remarks about compensation may seem gratuitous in a case in which it found no
taking, the court has given landowners a far better signal than did
the Supreme Court of California, which, also in a case with no taking, purported to ban compensation for regulatory takings
5
26

altogether.

E. FloridaLegislation
In not adopting the position of the California and New York
courts that state restrictions on land use are never compensable,
the supreme court in Estuary avoided potential conflict both with
the Supreme Court's apparent position in San Diego and with a
recent legislative determination that such restrictions may result in
compensation in certain circumstances.2 66 The Florida Legislature
amended the Land and Water Management Act 2 67 in 1978, too late

to affect the litigation in the Estuary case.268 Essentially a reme262. 1981 FLA. L. WEEKLY at 279.
263. Id. (citing Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972)). The

finding that the proposed development would pollute the surrounding bays was a major
factor in the supreme court's analysis and makes the Estuary case an ill-suited vehicle for
litigating regulatory taking issues.
264. Id.
265. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
375 (1979).
266. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-85.
267. FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.25 (1977) (amended by 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-85).
268. 1981 FLA. L. WEEKLY at 276 n.1.
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dies bill, this amendment provides for judicial determination of the
taking issue in specified land use regulation controversies. Like
Justice Brennan's proposal, the statute leaves the initial choice of
remedies with the regulating entity after the court determines that
the regulation is a taking, but it does not expressly provide compensation for any prior temporary taking. The statute does not apply to zoning ordinances and differs in other ways from the Model
Land Development Code.
Interestingly, the remedies statute began as a compensable
land use regulation proposal. Two different bills introduced in the
1976 Legislature269 resulted from the report of a Florida Senate
committee created to study the taking issue.170 Both bills died in
committee, as did successor proposals in 1977,71 but in 1978 sponsors introduced in both houses a proposal essentially identical to
the 1977 House Bill. House Bill 889272 and the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 261 differed significantly from their predecessor, however, by specifically exempting zoning regulations from the
proposed legislation, which otherwise covered all state, county, municipal, and other local government land use regulations.2 78
Under the proposal, a landowner could challenge the validity
of the regulation in the circuit court by establishing an economic
loss resulting either from a diminution in fair market value or from
deprivation of certain land use rights' 74 The governmental authority then would have the burden of proving that the regulation was
a proper exercise of its police power, with the court required to
27
weigh the public benefit against the landowner's detriment. 5 If
the regulation was adjudicated valid but imposed on the landowner
an "inordinate burden" (defined as the loss "occasioned by a regu269. FLA. S.B. 1270, 1976 Reg. Sese. (requiring modification, variance, or compensation
for coastal construction setback regulations and for legislation affecting areas of critical concern) (introduced by Senator Lewis); FLA. H.B. 3810, 1976 Reg. Sess. (requiring regulatory
agencies to compensate for, withdraw, or waive police power land use regulations, including
zoning, found procedurally valid, when the public benefit outweighs the landowner's detriment) (introduced by Representatives Morgan, Bloom, T. Lewis, and others).
270. See FLORIDA SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND ACQUISITION,
1976 REG. SEss., FINAL COMM. REPORT ON THE "TAKING ISSUE" (1976); Rhodes, supra note
259, at 741-42.
271. FLA. S.B. 788, 1977 Reg. Sess. (coastal construction setback lines) (introduced by
Senators Ware, Gallen, and Barron); FLA. H.B. 571, 1977 Reg. Sess. (land use regulations,
including zoning) (introduced by Representatives Morgan, Bloom, and others).
272. FLA. H.B. 889, 1978 Reg. Seas.
273. FLA. C.S./S.B. 261, 1978 Reg. Seas, § 2(1).
274. Id. § 3.
275. Id.
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lation imposed on a specified area of land to provide a benefit to
the public outside that area"27), then the court could direct the
governmental authority to elect to: "(1) Compensate the landowner
for the loss sustained; (2) Withdraw the regulation; (3) Waive the
regulation as to that parcel of land; or (4) Modify the regulation to
remove the inordinate burden."'2 "7 If the governmental authority
chose compensation, the court would determine the amount of the
loss, less any enhancement in land value attributable to govern27 8
mental action.
As introduced, these bills were clearly proposals for compensable regulation, because the compensation remedy was triggered not
by a "taking" that deprived the landowner of all beneficial use, but
by a police-power distribution of public benefits beyond the regulated area. Like the Model Land Development Code, the proposal
retained the regulating entity's control over its eminent domain
power, since no provision authorized the court to-order compensation. 279 Unlike the Model Code, the proposal exempted zoning ordinances, and it rebuttably presumed the preregulation fair market
28 0
value to be the assessed value of the property.
As revised and passed by the legislature,2 8 1 however, the statute does not provide for partial compensable regulation. Rather, it
gives the regulating entity the choice between alternative remedies
in certain taking controversies. Although the revisions broadened
the class of persons with standing to seek review from "landowners" to any persons "substantially affected," only land use regulations under five designated chapters of the Florida Statutes remained under the revised version.2 s ' The statute confines the
276. Id. § 2(3).
277. Id. § 4.
278. Id. § 5. By calculating the compensation net after regulatory enhancement, the
proposal would recapture governmental "windfalls" not already taxed or assessed to the
landowner. See generally D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS (1978).
279. ALI MODEL LAND DEvELOPMENT CODE § 9-112(3) (1975); see notes 185-90 and accompanying text supra. The failure expressly to authorize compensation without the
agency's consent is deceptive, however, since the proposal's alternative remedies were cumulative with others provided by law. FLA. C.S./S.B. 261, 1978 Reg. Sess. § 8. Indeed, a state's
attempt to bar the just compensation remedy altogether would probably be unconstitu-

tional, as the San Diego opinions indicate.
280. FLA. C.S./S.B. 261, 1978 Reg. Sess. § 5. The assessed value provision would discourage the use of other regulations such as zoning to lower property values, thereby reducing the compensation.
281. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-85, §§ 1-6 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 161.212, 253.763,
373.617, 380.085, 403.90 (1979)).
282. Beach and Shore Preservation, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011-.45 (1979); Public Lands and
Property, id. §§ 253.001-.785; Water Resources Act, id. §§ 373.012-.617; Land and Water
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circuit court's review to determining whether the challenged action
by the regulatory agency "is an unreasonable exercise of the state's
police power constituting a taking without just compensation."28 8
If the court finds a taking, it remands the matter to the agency,
which within a reasonable time must:
(1) Agree to issue the permit; or
(2) Agree to pay appropriate monetary damages, provided
however, in determining the amount of compensation to be paid,
consideration shall be given by the court to any enhancement to
the value of the land attributable to governmental action; or
(3) Agree to modify its decision to avoid an unreasonable
exercise of police power.s
If the agency chooses an alternative that is a reasonable exercise of
the police power, then the court approves it; if the agency fails to
propose a reasonable exercise of the police power within ninety
days, however, the court may order the agency to perform one of
the three listed alternatives.2 85
The substitution of the "taking without just compensation"
standard for the "inordinate burden" standard effectively writes
compensable regulation out of the statute. If one assumes that the
legislature intended to incorporate judicial "taking" standards,
then only a deprivation of substantially all beneficial use will now
trigger the possibility of compensation. On the other hand, the opportunity for the courts to remand the regulation to the agency for
modification, rather than make the harsh choice between no compensation, invalidation, and full compensation, may make the
courts less reluctant to find "takings" in land use controversies.
The statute permits the court to defer formulation of the particular remedy to the agency, assuming that unreasonable agency officials do not trap the landowner on a "treadmill" of repeated permit denials without constructive counter-proposals.28 6 Unlike the
Model Land Development Code, the Florida statute deters such
Management, id. §§ 380.012-.25; Environmental Control, id. § 403.011-.90.
283. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-85 § 2.
284. Id. § 3.

285. Id. § 4.
286. See Estuary, 381 So. 2d at 1137. This potential for "treadmill" abuse may be why

the First District did not give the agency the third statutory option of modifying its action
on the requested permit: "County commissioners and the Adjudicatory Commission could
entrap a developer in a virtual bureaucratic revolving door, until he finally collapses from
financial exhaustion, or withdraws his application from simple frustration." Id. See also
FLA. STAT. § 380.08(3) (1979) (requiring agencies to specify changes in development proposal
necessary for agency approval).
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abuse by authorizing the court to order compensation if the agency
fails to respond with a reasonable police power regulation.287
Although the Florida remedies statute does not govern zoning
ordinances, it does parallel the response of the courts in "confiscatory" zoning controversies: the regulating entity should retain the
choice between condemnation and rezoning the property. Because
the San Diego and Estuary opinions cast considerable doubt on
the continued validity of Mailman, the Florida courts should now
sustain inverse condemnation counts past the pleading stage and
permit landowners to go forward with proof of deprivation of substantially all beneficial use of the property. Assuming that the
landowner can prove such a deprivation, which would be rare in a
zoning case, the proper judicial response would be a remand to the
zoning authority to choose an appropriate remedy. It remains an
open question whether the court, without statutory authority,
could order compensation in the event of abusive delays indicating
a governmental purpose to appropriate the property for public use
under the guise of a zoning ordinance. Lesser deprivations of beneficial use will remain uncompensable until the legislature adopts a
compensable regulation plan applicable to zoning. If the limited
scope of the Florida Legislature's most recent effort is any guide,
such a development is unlikely in the near future.

287. Compare ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 9-112(3) (1975) with 1978 Fla.
Laws ch. 78-85, § 4.
The Florida statute thus gives the agency one "free" opportunity to regulate unconstitutionally before it runs the risk of compensation. One commentator advocating injunctive
relief rather than compensation to deter the treadmill effect has suggested that the answer
is to limit the agency's opportunities to impose new invalid restrictions:

Acceptance of the principle that in some cases compensation must be paid
for regulation would have much less utility than would acceptance of the idea
that municipalities do not get more than one chance to be wrong about the constitutionality of their land use regulations. If more state courts would accept the
concept that the price municipalities must pay for invalid regulation is not com-

pensation but judicial protection for the construction of the development forbidden by the regulations, then local councils and zoning officials might be more
hesitant to risk regulations of questionable validity.

Smith, supra note 225, at 54, col. 1. The Florida statute also authorizes the court to order
issuance of the permit if the agency's second attempt does not.produce a valid police-power
regulation. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-85, §§ 3-4.

For a fuller discussion of chapter 78-85, see Rhodes, supra note 259.

